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Abstract
This work analyses how investors and market participants perceive corporate de-
ﬁned beneﬁt pensions.
The ﬁrst chapter compares how pension obligations impact the market value of
US corporations under two accounting regimes. I ﬁnd that market participants
take into account the net position of the pension fund only if it is recognized on
the sponsor's balance sheet. Before 2006 investors seem to focus on the accrual
recognized on the balance sheet rather than the net funding position of the scheme
disclosed in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements, thus mispricing the pension
deﬁcit/surplus when valuing the sponsor.
The second chapter focuses on UK deﬁned beneﬁt pensions and in particular on
how future liabilities are discounted. I ﬁnd that equity market valuation of DB
pensions is consistent with discounting that allows for no credit risk. This is the
appropriate approach but diﬀers from that used in published accounts for which
IAS 19 (and SFAS 158, its US equivalent) allows for discounting with a corporate
bond yield. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, as credit risk free discounting would
decrease the reported value of FTSE 100 ﬁrms by about 7%.
The third chapter investigates the ability of analysts to incorporate the income
eﬀect of deﬁned beneﬁt pensions on their earnings estimates. The earning compo-
nent of deﬁned beneﬁt pensions can be reliably estimated using a set of assumption
chosen by the sponsoring company and disclosed in its annual report. I ﬁnd that
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analysts persistently fail to use this information in their forecasts. I also exploit the
diﬀerent reporting periods of the companies in my sample together with a change
in pension accounting rules to show that analysts at ﬁrst fail to incorporate the
eﬀects of the accounting revision in their forecasts, but they do so for companies
adopting it later.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: accounting for deﬁned
beneﬁt pensions
This introductory chapter aims at clarifying the regulatory background of my
thesis. The unifying theme of the next three chapters is that they all investigate
issues revolving around market participants' perceptions of deﬁned beneﬁt pensions
and how these perceptions changes as the regulatory system does.
Deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions are by nature complex and long term arrange-
ments. Despite the move towards contributory pensions, DB pensions still repre-
sent a signiﬁcant commitment for most of the companies listed in either the US
or the UK. I believe that the complexity of the institutional background and the
sheer size of the liabilities involved provide an ideal setting to test a number of
research questions concerning how market participants perceive and value these
commitments under diﬀerent accounting regimes. Accounting for deﬁned bene-
ﬁt pensions has been evolving in the past 20 years, with a focus on increasing
transparency and making these liabilities more explicit. This period has also been
marked by a change of focus in accounting, from historical cost to fair value ac-
counting. This move clearly had repercussions on how DB pensions are accounted
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for and presented to users of ﬁnancial statements.
This introduction explains accounting for DB pensions in both the US and
UK, highlighting the regulatory changes that are the background of my research
questions in the following chapters. The next section explains the basics of accrual
accounting for DB pensions, that have been largely left untouched by the changes
in regulations and are common in both the US and the UK. Section 1.2 analyzes in
detail accounting for DB pensions under US GAAP, focusing on its evolution over
time. Section 1.3 discusses the same matter under the International Accounting
Standards, the relevant framework for companies listed in the United Kingdom.
The last section concludes.
1.1 Accounting for DB pensions
This section lays out the basic of accounting for DB pensions, common to both US
GAAP and IAS. These two regimes have a shared focus on accrual accounting, so
that costs and revenues are recorded in the period when they occur, irrespective
of cash movements. Thanks to the convergence of accounting standards world-
wide, the two legislations share many features but have also important diﬀerences.
This section focuses on their shared provisions, while the next two highlight the
speciﬁcity of each standard. DB pensions have income statement, comprehensive
income, balance sheet and cash ﬂow eﬀects, which I will analyze in turn.
1.1.1 Income statement
A company sponsoring a deﬁned beneﬁt pension scheme has to record the beneﬁts
earned by its employees in each accounting period. The corresponding entry is
service cost, representing the discounted value of the future beneﬁts earned by
employees during the year. This entry is always a cost for a company with an active
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DB scheme, but is zero for sponsors that have closed their schemes to new members
and future accruals (so that beneﬁts are frozen). Companies which have closed
their DB scheme to future accruals generally oﬀer diﬀerent retirement beneﬁts to
their current employees (typically deﬁned contribution pension schemes). Service
cost is often booked under employee compensation in the income statement.
The other recurring entries in the income statement for a company sponsoring a
DB scheme are interest cost and expected return on assets. Interest cost represents
the eﬀect of the passage of time on pension liabilities: since the value of the
latter is discounted, as time goes by liabilities increase mechanically as they are
one year closer to their due date. Hence interest cost is calculated as pension
liabilities times their discount rate. In both the UK and the US DB pensions are
funded, meaning that there is a pool of assets to cover for pension liabilities. These
assets are invested and companies book a revenue item equal to their expected
return (not their actual return). Under both US GAAP and IAS 19 sponsors
enjoyed considerable freedom in setting their expected return on assets, but with
the latest revision of IAS 19 this is set to be equal to the discount rate on pension
liabilities.1 The ﬁnancial component of DB pension cost is generally booked under
ﬁnancial expenses in the income statement. This is the also the most predictable
component of pension cost, it can be readily estimated using the values for pension
assets/liabilities and the ﬁnancial assumptions disclosed by each company. In the
fourth chapter I ask whether ﬁnancial analysts incorporate in their estimates the
predictable eﬀect that this component of DB costs has on earnings.
Other DB pension related income statement entries follow exceptional events.
Curtailments arise when beneﬁts are cut, either because the beneﬁt formula changes
for all employees or because some of them will enjoy a diﬀerent treatment in the
1More details on the diﬀerence between IAS 19 and IAS 19 revised are presented in section
1.3
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future (for instance following the sale of a business unit). Settlements are transac-
tions that eliminate all further obligations for all or part of the beneﬁts under the
plan. The simplest case of settlement is when employees decide to renounce their
entitlement for an annuity, opting instead for a lump-sum payment. More complex
settlements arise when the sponsor sells part of its plan to an insurer, which in
turn guarantees annuities to participants. Plans amendments and curtailments
often give rise also to past service costs. The latter follows changes to the plan's
formula that require adjustments to the service cost that was booked in the past.
All the DB pension related income statements entries are grouped together into
net periodic pension cost (NPPC), an entry that summarizes the proﬁt and loss
impact of DB pensions.2
1.1.2 Actuarial gains and losses
Not all the changes in value of DB pensions go through the income statement.
Remeasurement eﬀects due to changes in assumptions in the formula to compute
pension liabilities are generally orders of magnitude bigger than the NPPC de-
scribed above. These remeasurement eﬀects are mainly due to changes in actuarial
assumptions, so they are labelled actuarial gains and losses. Since companies are
allowed to book an expected return on assets in their income statement, also the
diﬀerence between the real return achieved on pension assets and this hypothetic
measure falls under actuarial G&L.
Actuarial gains and losses hit shareholders' equity bypassing the income state-
ment, so they are booked only in other comprehensive income (OCI). Before the
introduction of SFAS No. 158 and IAS 19 revised, companies had the option to
2Under both SFAS No. 87 and the original IAS 19 companies had the possibility of smoothing
actuarial gains and losses using the corridor approach. If this was the case, actuarial gains and
losses above a certain threshold were recycled in the income statement. I describe the corridor
in more detail below.
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avoid OCI recognition and could disclose these items only in the notes, as long as
the cumulative total of gains and losses did not exceed 10% of the biggest between
liabilities and assets. This is know as the "corridor" approach: its rationale is
that actuarial gains and losses should compensate over time. If this was not the
case and actuarial gains or losses were above the corridor threshold, the exceeding
part had to amortized in the income statement (thus adding another component
to NPPC).
1.1.3 Pension assets and liabilities
The gross values of DB pensions' assets and liabilities are not recognized on the
balance sheet of the sponsor but rather disclosed in the notes. The biggest change
brought forward in 2006 by the introduction of IAS 19 in Europe and SFAS No.
158 in the US is that their sum (net pension assets or NPA, the surplus/deﬁcit of
pension funds) has to be recognized, while the gross amount of assets and liabilities
is still disclosed only in the notes. I investigate if the movement from disclosure
to recognition of NPA changed investors' valuation of DB sponsors in the ﬁrst
chapter, using US data.
Both pension assets and liabilities are marked to market. This is easier for
pension assets, as most of them are actively traded securities. Valuing pension
liabilities is much more complicated, as they are not traded and their valuation
depends on a host of assumptions made by the sponsoring companies. Since these
liabilities are by nature very long term and they have to be discounted, the discount
rate plays a crucial role in their valuation. In the third chapter I exploit the
unique features of UK data to investigate if the AA corporate bond rate that the
accounting standards prescribe is indeed the appropriate discount rate for this
exercise.
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Liabilities are generally measured using the projected beneﬁt obligation or
PBO. This measure takes into account also the beneﬁts that have been earned
but have not vested yet and future salary increases in case of ﬁnal salary DB
schemes. Companies are allowed to weight beneﬁts earned but non vested accord-
ing to their experience, hence taking into account employees' turnover. So the
PBO measures pension liabilities on a going concern basis.
1.1.4 Cash contributions to DB schemes
In both the US and the UK DB schemes are funded, so that companies have to
contribute cash to the schemes, building a pool of assets meant to cover the future
pension liabilities. Contributions are not part of the income statement, but rather
get recorded in the cash ﬂow statement. In both the US and the UK pension
contributions are tax deductable.
The level of contributions is agreed with the fund's trustees to guarantee future
solvency. A rough rule of thumb is to set contributions equal to service cost,
hence at the level of (discounted) beneﬁts earned by employees during the period.
However there are signiﬁcant deviations to this heuristic: often when schemes
are in surplus companies contribute less, sometimes none at all (this is called a
contribution holiday). When schemes are in deﬁcit contributions rise, most of the
times following a multi year plan agreed among the company, the trustees and the
regulator to address the deﬁcit.
National laws regulate the cases of most severe underfunding, setting rules to
defend the employees' right to a pension in the future. The relevant regulations
are the Pension Act for the UK and the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) in the US.
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1.2 DB pension accounting under US GAAP
This section focuses on the evolution of US GAAP regulating ﬁnancial reporting
for DB pensions in the last 30 years, highlighting the diﬀerences with the basics of
accrual accounting discussed above.
From 1987 until 2006 the relevant standard was SFAS No. 87 Employers'
accounting for pensions (FASB (1985)), which mandated the reporting on the
balance sheet of a net prepaid pension asset or accrued pension liability that rep-
resented only a part of the sponsor's pension assets and liabilities. In particular,
the funding status recognized on the balance sheet was the result of netting several
oﬀ-balance-sheet items: pension assets, pension liabilities (measured as projected
beneﬁt obligation or PBO), prior service cost, actuarial gains and losses, the dif-
ference between expected and realized return on plans' assets and net transition
assets or liabilities. The rationale behind these adjustments is to have a smoothed
measure for pension surplus/deﬁcit, eliminating the eﬀects of ﬂuctuations in the
value of assets and liabilities. The resulting asset or liability recognized on the
balance sheet was essentially the cumulative diﬀerence between pension expenses
recognized by the company in its income statement and cash contribution to the
pension fund, with a net asset arising if contributions were above pension expenses
or a liability in the reverse case. The accrual computed under SFAS No. 87 could
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the underlying surplus/deﬁcit of the pension fund,
as ﬁgure 2.1 in chapter 2 shows. Companies were also required to recognize a
minimum liability if the value of pension assets was smaller than the accumulated
beneﬁt obligation (ABO), a measure of pension liabilities that does not include
beneﬁts that have not yet vested and future salary increases. In other words,
the ABO is the amount of pension liabilities if the plan was to be terminated
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immediately.
SFAS No. 87 also allowed companies to use a smoothed measure for pension
assets rather than their value at the balance sheet date when estimating expected
return on pension assets. This measure was called market related value and gave
signiﬁcant leeway to management in its determination, with the limit of using no
more than 5 years in the smoothing process. This changed with the introduction of
SFAS No. 132 that dictated the use of market value of assets in determining their
expected return. Actuarial gains and losses were accounted for using the corridor
approach described above.
The disclosure requirements for DB schemes were signiﬁcantly expanded by
the introduction of SFAS No. 132 in 1998 (and by its revised version issued in
2003), but neither standard changed the measurement or recognition requirements
of SFAS No. 87. Both these requirements changed with the introduction of SFAS
No. 158 in December 2006. The most important requirements of SFAS No. 158
are that companies have to fully recognize the funding status of their pension
schemes on the balance sheet and recognize in other comprehensive income (OCI)
the ﬁnancial eﬀects of certain plan events when they occur.3 Thus the balance sheet
recognition of previously disclosed items requires an OCI oﬀset. Under SFAS No.
158 the corridor approach is no longer allowed, so companies have to recognize
immediately actuarial gains and losses in OCI.
The introduction of SFAS No. 158 typically increased the reported DB pension
liabilities, as under the previous standard companies were allowed to recognize an
asset even if their schemes were in deﬁcit. The FASB's objective in introducing
this new reporting standard was to increase the transparency and usefulness of
3These include actuarial gain and losses, prior service cost, the diﬀerence between expected
and realized return on plan's assets and transition asset or liability. Under the previous regime
these items were deferred and gradually amortized in net income when they were above a certain
threshold, using the corridor approach.
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reported pension information. The next chapter focuses on the diﬀerence between
disclosure and recognition of net pension assets, asking if this change in accounting
rules changed the valuation of DB schemes that investors attach to the sponsoring
companies.
1.3 International Accounting Standards
Since 2006 the relevant accounting standard for companies listed in the UK is IAS
19, which was later revised, with the new version mandatory since 2013. To avoid
confusion, I refer to the original version as IAS 19 and to the revised version as
IAS 19R. Before 2006 UK companies accounted for DB pensions under Financial
Reporting Standard 17, which did not require balance sheet recognition for net
pension assets.
The main change with IAS 19 is the obligation to recognize the net position of
the pension funds (NPA) on the balance sheet. Companies could choose how to
account for actuarial gains and losses between three options: the corridor approach,
immediate OCI recognition and immediate proﬁt and loss recognition. The last
proved very unpopular, with none of the constituents of FTSE 350 following it.
Most of the companies opted for OCI, but a minority decided to follow the corridor
approach.
Despite the minor diﬀerence in wording between IAS 19 and SFAS No. 158,
the discount rate provision of both standards has been interpreted in the same
way, so that companies under both standards use AA rated corporate bond yields.
This provision has proven controversial, as I argue in section 3.3. Standard setters
considered changing it during the consultation period that preceded the intro-
duction of IAS 19R, but opted for no modiﬁcation. Instead, they increased the
disclosure requirements, adding the duration of pension liabilities. However most
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of the biggest UK companies were already disclosing it in the sensitivity analysis
of pension assumptions in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. The third chapter
uses these data to ask if market participants take the sponsors' assumptions at
face value when valuing DB pensions.
The main change introduced by IAS 19R is to eliminate the diﬀerence in ac-
counting for actuarial gains and losses, prescribing that all companies should rec-
ognize them in OCI in the period when they occur. Another important diﬀerence
between IAS 19 and IAS 19R is that under the latter companies have to use the
discount rate as their expected rate of return on pension assets. Hence with IAS
19R the ﬁnancial component of NPPC is equal to net pension assets times the
discount rate on pension liabilities, irrespective of the pension assets allocation
of each sponsor. In the fourth chapter I investigate also if this change improved
analysts' ability to forecast the ﬁnancial component of NPPC.
1.4 Conclusion
This introductory chapter explained the intricacy of pension accounting that is
the background to my research hypotheses in the following chapters. The second
chapters looks at the diﬀerence between disclosure and recognition, asking if equity
markets value DB sponsors diﬀerently in the two regimes. The change from SFAS
No. 87 to SFAS No. 158 is an ideal setting for this research question as it does not
modify the type of information that market participants receive, just the delivery
method.
The third chapter uses the sensitivity analysis that companies disclose under
IAS 19 to estimate a discounted value of pension liabilities using a credit risk-free
rate and uses this measure to test if market participants believe the companies'
assumptions in their valuation exercises.
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The fourth chapter tests if analysts use the assumptions that the companies
disclose in the note to the ﬁnancial statements in their earnings estimates. As the
ﬁnancial component of NPPC is predictable under both IAS 19 and its revised
version, I ask if analysts incorporate this element in their forecasts under each
standard.
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Chapter 2
Disclosure versus recognition: the
value relevance of pensions
2.1 Introduction
In 2006 the accounting regime for US deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions changed dra-
matically, for the ﬁrst time sponsoring companies had to recognize on the balance
sheet the funded status of their pension funds. Before this information was only
disclosed in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements, with an accrual on the balance
sheet that bore little relation to the true surplus/deﬁcit it was meant to sum-
marize:1 as ﬁgure 1 shows, the average company was recognizing an asset on its
balance sheet despite having a pension deﬁcit. In this paper I investigate whether
the move from disclosure to recognition changed investors' perception of DB pen-
sions, confronting the value relevance of pensions under the two accounting regimes
and identifying the eﬀect of the introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) No. 158 in 2006.
1I describe in more detail accounting for DB pension under both SFAS No. 87 and 158 in
section 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Pension funding under SFAS No. 87 and 158
Notes: The chart shows the average reported pension asset/liability under SFAS No. 87 (black
columns) and the average funding status of DB schemes disclosed in the notes to the ﬁnan-
cial statements before SFAS No. 158 and recognized on the balance sheet afterwards (shaded
columns), in million US Dollars.
A vast body of research has investigated whether disclosure in the footnotes is a
substitute for recognition in the ﬁnancial statements. The eﬃcient market hypoth-
esis in semi-strong form implies that there should be no diﬀerence, as long as the
information is publicly available. However, standard setters tend to view disclo-
sure and recognition as diﬀerent: for instance, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) aﬃrms that footnote disclosure is not an adequate substitute for
recognition (FASB (2006), paragraph 116). Recent research in accounting tends
to agree, ﬁnding that disclosure and recognition are diﬀerent in terms of value rel-
evance (e.g., Ahmed et al. (2006), Davis-Friday et al. (1999) and Michels (2017)),
with market participants placing more weight on recognized information. My work
contributes to this debate by studying the valuation implications of disclosure ver-
sus recognition for pension surpluses/deﬁcits. The introduction of SFAS No. 158
provides a good framework for testing this hypothesis, as it did not change how the
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funding status of a pension plan is calculated. Hence in this setting disclosure and
recognition can be compared for exactly the same item. Moreover, SFAS No. 158
became mandatory for all the companies at the same time, limiting the selection
problem that often comes with the possibility of early adoption.
My study also contributes to the extensive literature that has looked at the
implications of DB pensions, especially the strand that focuses on valuation, such
as Coronado and Sharpe (2003), Hann et al. (2007a) and Coronado et al. (2008).
The introduction of SFAS No. 158 itself has also been studied extensively, with
a number of papers asking a research question similar to what I am addressing,
like Beaudoin et al. (2011), Mitra and Hossain (2009) and Yu (2012). My work
contributes to this debate by using a larger sample and a diﬀerent econometric
technique that allows me to identify more precisely the eﬀect of the accounting
change in 2006. Most of those papers focus only on 2005 and 2006, a choice that is
problematic given that the wording and introduction date of SFAS No. 158 were
already publicly know at the end of 2005 when companies published their balance
sheets.2 To circumvent this problem I use data from 2001 to 2014. Yu (2012) uses
data from 1999 but stops in 2007, thus failing to take into account the increase
in pension deﬁcits due to the ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent fall in interest
rates from 2008 onwards ( ﬁgure 1 shows the worsening of the funded status of DB
pensions from 2008 onwards). I discuss the diﬀerences between these works and
mine in section 2.3.
Overall, my results suggest that investors treat disclosed and recognized infor-
mation diﬀerently, focusing on the number recognized on the balance sheet and
thus mispricing DB pensions' surpluses/deﬁcits before the introduction of SFAS
No. 158. Using a sample of 2590 ﬁrm (21063 observations) I document that the
2I discuss these paper in more detail in section 2.3, while section 2.6.1 elaborates on the
problems of using only 2005 and 2006.
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funded status of DB pensions is value relevant only after 2006, while before only
the balance sheet accrual recognized under SFAS No. 87 accounting is value rele-
vant. Then I focus on the introduction of SFAS No. 158 and try to pin down its
eﬀect using a panel of 773 DB sponsors and 956 control ﬁrms over the 10 years
surrounding the accounting reform. My results suggest that the new account-
ing standard is indeed responsible for the change in investors' perception of DB
pensions' surpluses/deﬁcits.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes pension ac-
counting under SFAS no. 87 and SFAS No. 158. Section 2.3 places my work in the
wider context of the literature on DB pensions and disclosure versus recognition,
and discusses the links between my contribution and the papers that have looked
at the same issue. Section 2.4 presents the data and the empirical strategy I use
to address my research question, while section 2.6 discusses my results. The last
section concludes. Further robustness tests are provided in the appendices.
2.2 Pension accounting under SFAS No. 87 and
158
Accounting for DB pensions has evolved continuously in the past 20 years. From
1987 until 2006 the relevant standard was SFAS No. 87 Employers' accounting for
pensions (FASB (1985)), which mandated the reporting on the balance sheet of a
net prepaid pension asset or accrued pension liability that represented only a part
of the sponsor's pension assets and liabilities. In particular, the funding status
recognized on the balance sheet was the result of netting several oﬀ-balance-sheet
items: pension assets, pension liabilities (measured as projected beneﬁt obligation
or PBO), prior service cost, actuarial gains and losses, the diﬀerence between
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expected and realized return on plans' assets and net transition assets or liabilities.
The rationale behind these adjustments is to have a smoothed measure for pension
surplus/deﬁcit, eliminating the eﬀects of ﬂuctuations in the value of assets and
liabilities. The resulting asset or liability recognized on the balance sheet was
essentially the cumulative diﬀerence between pension expenses recognized by the
company in its income statement and cash contribution to the pension fund, with
a net asset arising if contributions were above pension expenses or a liability in
the reverse case. The accrual computed under SFAS No. 87 could be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the underlying surplus/deﬁcit of the pension fund, as ﬁgure 2.1 above
shows.
The disclosure requirements for DB schemes were signiﬁcantly expanded by
the introduction of SFAS No. 132 in 1998 (and by its revised version issued in
2003), but neither standard changed the measurement or recognition requirements
of SFAS No. 87. Both of these requirements changed with the introduction of
SFAS No. 158 in December 2006. The most important requirements of SFAS No.
158 are that companies have to fully recognize the funding status of their pension
schemes on the balance sheet and recognize in other comprehensive income (OCI)
the ﬁnancial eﬀects of certain plan events when they occur.3 Thus the balance
sheet recognition of previously disclosed items requires an OCI oﬀset.
The introduction of SFAS No. 158 typically increased the reported DB pension
liabilities, as under the previous standard companies were allowed to recognize an
asset even if their schemes were in deﬁcit. The FASB's objective in introducing
this new reporting standard was to increase the transparency and usefulness of
reported pension information. In the rest of the paper I investigate if this is the
3These include actuarial gain and losses, prior service cost, the diﬀerence between expected
and realized return on plan's assets and transition asset or liability. Under the previous regime
these items were deferred and gradually amortized in net income when they were above a certain
threshold.
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case for equity investors.
2.3 Literature review
My work contributes to two large strands of literature, one focusing on the value
relevance of disclosed versus recognized accounting information and the other re-
garding the valuation of DB pensions. Whether disclosure and recognition are good
substitutes has been a central question in accounting research, with recent empir-
ical evidence suggesting that investors underweight disclosed information. Ahmed
et al. (2006) ﬁnds that recognized derivative positions are value relevant while the
disclosed ones are not, while Davis-Friday et al. (1999) ﬁnd modest evidence that
market participants place more weight on recognized rather than disclosed infor-
mation in the context of post-retirement beneﬁts other than pensions. Schipper
(2007) discusses disclosure from various standpoints, arguing that it is perceived
diﬀerently from recognition. The literature has put forward various explanations
for this, with a stream of literature suggesting that recognized information is more
reliable like Davis-Friday et al. (2004) and Frederickson et al. (2006). Another set
of papers argues that the diﬀerence is due to information processing, either because
users of ﬁnancial statements lack the competence to understand disclosure (Dear-
man and Shields (2005)) or because of cognitive biases (Hobson and Kachelmeier
(2005) and Koonce et al. (2005)). Barth et al. (2003) provides a theoretical treat-
ment of disclosure versus recognition. In this paper I don't address the question
of what motivates the diﬀerent reaction to disclosed and recognized information,
I focus on establishing the diﬀerence between the two in a setting that minimizes
the many research design problems typical to this type of study and discussed in
Bernard and Schipper (1994).
DB pensions have a great inﬂuence in many aspects of corporate life and have
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been studied extensively. Here I focus only on the stream of literature that discusses
the valuation implications of this type of pension, the closest studies to my work.
For a recent comprehensive review of the literature on DB pensions I refer to Coco
(2014). The empirical evidence on the value relevance of DB pensions is mixed. An
earlier set of papers found that stock prices fully reﬂect the funding status of DB
schemes, like Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983) and Bulow
et al. (1987). Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et al. (2008) ﬁnd that
instead investors focus on the the earnings impact of pensions while disregarding
their funding status. Hann et al. (2007a) ﬁnds that both income statement and
balance sheet variables are value relevant. Using an asset pricing approach Franzoni
and Marin (2006) ﬁnds that companies with severely underfunded DB pensions
earn signiﬁcantly lower returns. Their ﬁndings are reinforced by Picconi (2006),
who shows that analysts systematically fail to take DB pensions into account when
forecasting earnings.
A set of recent papers investigates the eﬀects of the introduction of SFAS No.
158, asking a research question very close to mine. Mitra and Hossain (2009) ﬁnd
a negative relation between stock returns and the pension transition adjustment
in 2006, the adoption year of SFAS No. 158, a relationship driven by large S&P
500 ﬁrms. Beaudoin et al. (2011) use a slightly diﬀerent sample and compare the
value relevance of the funded status of DB schemes in 2005 (disclosure year) and
2006 (recognition year), ﬁnding that investor price this information correctly in
both accounting regimes. However, I believe that using only 2005 and 2006 to in-
vestigate the value relevance of disclosed and recognized pension surpluses/deﬁcits
might lead to spurious conclusions, as the FASB made clear in November 2005
that it was going to overhaul pension accounting by requiring the recognition of
the funded status on balance sheet (FASB (2005)). This might have prompted
some investors to anticipate the accounting reform and change their perception
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of disclosed information for ﬁscal year 2005. To mitigate this problem I exclude
the year 2005 from my regression aimed at establishing a causal link between the
introduction of SFAS No. 158 and the change in value relevance of pension sur-
pluses/deﬁcits. Later work by Yu (2012) uses a larger sample, stretching from
1999 to 2007. He ﬁnds that the disclosed information about DB schemes is value
relevant and that this eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms with a high level of institutional
ownership and analyst following. He also ﬁnds that disclosure improves the value
relevance of pension funding for ﬁrms with a low level of institutional ownership
and analyst following. One potential problem with this sample is that during the
period analysed by Yu (2012) pension funds were signiﬁcantly better funded than
in the following decade.
My work diﬀers from these three paper in that it uses a signiﬁcantly larger
sample of ﬁrms and years, and a diﬀerent econometric technique that allows me to
pin down more eﬀectively the introduction of SFAS No. 158. Another diﬀerence
is that I cluster standard errors by company in all my speciﬁcations, while none of
these papers quoted above controls for correlation in standard errors. As Petersen
(2009) points out, failing to cluster the standard errors in a panel setting leads to
inﬂated t statistics that may jeopardize the inference. To facilitate the comparison
with the previous literature, I provide results using the same model as Beaudoin
et al. (2011) and Yu (2012) in appendix 2.10.
2.4 Research methodology and hypothesis devel-
opment
Barth et al. (2001) suggests that levels models are better speciﬁed to address the
question of what is reﬂected in ﬁrms' value, while changes models are appropriate
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to investigate timeliness of the accounting amounts. Given my research question of
how a pension surplus/deﬁcit inﬂuences the valuation of the sponsoring company,
a levels model appears the most appropriate. In doing so I follow the extensive
literature that has addressed this issue before (for instance Coronado and Sharpe
(2003), Coronado et al. (2008), Hann et al. (2007a), Hann et al. (2007b), Yu
(2012)). Hence the main model I employ to investigate empirically the valuation
of DB pension scheme is a parsimonious speciﬁcation of the residual income model,
put forward by Feltham and Ohlson (1995). In their model, the market value of a
ﬁrm's equity is expressed as the sum of the value emanating from the company's
non-ﬁnancial core activities plus the unrelated ﬁnancial activities. I modify this
model to make room for pensions as in the previous literature, dividing both income
statement and balance sheet variables into pension and non-pension components.
The next subsection describes the model I use to analyse value relevance of DB
pensions, highlighting the hypothesis that I test and the expected coeﬃcients. The
following subsection presents the slight modiﬁcations I make to both my model and
hypothesis to focus on the eﬀect of the introduction of SFAS No. 158.
2.4.1 Value relevance of DB pensions
My ﬁrst research question investigates the value relevance of DB pensions under
two diﬀerent accounting regimes, disclosure (under SFAS No. 87) and recognition
(under SFAS No. 158). As the same information about the funded status of
pension funds is publicly available under both regimes, market participants should
value it in the same way. Formally, I test the following hypothesis:
H1: Is the funded status of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans equally value
relevant under SFAS No.87 (disclosure) and SFAS No. 158 (recogni-
tion)?
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Consistent with prior research, the model I use to investigate the value relevance
of pension deﬁcits/surpluses in cross-section is the following, where all variables
are standardized by total company assets to make the series stationary and reduce
heteroskedasticity:4
Mcapi,t = α+β1BV ci,t+β2NPAi,t+β3Eci,t+β4NPPCi,t+
S∑
s=1
γsSs+
T∑
t=1
γtYt+i,t
(2.1)
This model expresses the market value of equity (Mcap) as a function of the core
book value of equity (BVc) deﬁned as the book value of equity minus the accounting
pension deﬁcit/surplus recognized on the balance sheet. Net pension assets (NPA)
represent the funded status of the DB pension schemes of the company; I deﬁne
it as pension assets minus pension liabilities (the projected beneﬁt obligation or
PBO), not taking into account any post-retirement beneﬁt other than pensions.
Although entering pension assets and liabilities separately into the model rather
than the net position might be useful for my analysis, the high correlation between
the two items means it is not practical to do so. Regarding income statement
variables, I divide earnings into core earnings (Ec) deﬁned as net income before
extraordinary items minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC) and NPPC itself.
NPPC collects all the pension related entries in the income statement: service cost
(beneﬁts accrued during the accounting period), interest cost (the eﬀect of time on
the pension obligation), expected return on plan's assets, temporary events such
as curtailment and settlements and the recycling into income of the unrecognized
4All the variables that I use in the main paper are standardized by total company assets
as in Coronado et al. (2008) and Beaudoin et al. (2011). I believe this to be the most stable
and economically better speciﬁed standardisation, however as a robustness test I provide my
most important results standardising the variables by the total number of shares outstanding
in appendix 2.9. Using total sales as denominator yields very similar estimates (results not
reported).
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pension deﬁcit if this is bigger than a certain threshold.5 As NPPC is a pre-tax
measure, I multiply it by 0.65 to compare it with earnings (assuming a tex rate of
35%). S and Y are industry (we use the ﬁrst four digit of GISC, with 24 industry
groups in total) and years dummies, respectively.
I expect the coeﬃcients on book value to be positive and close to 1. NPA is
positive when pension funds are in surplus and negative when they have a deﬁcit,
so its coeﬃcient should be positive if DB pensions are at least partially value
relevant. As contributions to the pension fund are tax deductible in the US, full
value relevance implies that the coeﬃcient on NPA should be bracketed between
1 and (1 - t), where t is the marginal tax rate that the average company faces.
Earnings are clearly positively associated with market value, so I expect a positive
coeﬃcient. I expect its magnitude to depend on the level of ﬁxed eﬀects imposed in
the regression. NPPC takes a negative value when the company reports a pension
cost in its income statement and a positive one when DB pensions contribute
positively to the ﬁrm's proﬁtability. As it is an income statement item, I expect
NPPC to have the same coeﬃcient as earnings if it is value relevant.
For the part of my sample where SFAS No. 87 is the relevant standard, I also
test whether investors apply diﬀerent weights to the accrual recognized on the
balance sheet to summarize the funding of the company's DB schemes and the
amount disclosed in the notes. To do so I create two new variables: ON bs, equal
to the accrual recognized under SFAS No. 87 and OFF bs, equal to the diﬀerence
between NPA and ON bs. In doing so, I follow part of the literature that splits the
pension obligations in the same way, like Yu (2012) and Beaudoin et al. (2011).
5This is under SFAS No. 87. With the introduction of SFAS No. 158 and the recognition
of NPA on the balance sheet, this component is lost. It is however substituted by a gradual
amortisation in income of the transition liability that has to be immediately recognized in OCI
upon the implementation of SFAS No. 158. See section 2.2 for a description of the changes
caused by the introduction of SFAS No. 158.
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So I bring to the data the following speciﬁcation:
Mcapi,t = α + β1BV ci,t + β2ONbsi,t + β3OFFbsi,t + β4Eci,t + β5NPPCi,t
+
S∑
s=1
γsSs +
T∑
t=1
γtYt + i,t
(2.2)
The variables ONbs and OFFbs sum up exactly to NPA, so this speciﬁcation
is equivalent to equation 2.1. Hence if DB pensions are value relevant both the
coeﬃcients on ONbs and OFFbs should be between 1 and (1 - t). On the other
hand, if market participants focus on information recognized on the balance sheet
and disregard disclosure in the notes, only ONbs should be value relevant.
I also test both of the models by year, thus running a battery of regressions of
both equations 2.1 and 2.2,6 dropping the year dummies. Further robustness tests
are in the appendices.
2.4.2 The introduction of SFAS No. 158
To identify the changes caused by the introduction of SFAS No. 158 and hence
the recognition of NPA on the balance sheet, I use a balanced panel of companies
(with and without DB schemes) that reported under both accounting regimes. The
goal is to pin down the eﬀects of the introduction of SFAS No. 158 on the value
relevance of pensions. Formally, I test the following hypothesis:
H2: The introduction of SFAS No. 158 increased the value relevance
of the funded status of deﬁned beneﬁt pensions
To test this hypothesis, I ﬁrst run equations 2.1 and 2.2 using company rather
than sector dummies. Then I focus on the reform itself and test whether it changed
6The results for equation 2.1 are not reported for brevity as they are nearly identical to those
of equation 2.2, but are available from the author on request.
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the perception of pension deﬁcits/surplues, running an estimation in the spirit of
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences using the following equation:
Mcapi,t = α+ β1BV ci,t + β2NPAi,t + β3NPAi,t ∗FAS158 + β4FAS158 + β5DB
+ β6FAS158 ∗DB + β7Eci,t + β8NPPCi,t +
I∑
i=1
γiIi +
T∑
t=1
γtYt + i,t (2.3)
Where FAS 158 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if SFAS No. 158 is the
relevant accounting standard and 0 otherwise, and DB is a dummy that takes the
value 1 if the company sponsors a DB scheme. The variable of interest is the
interaction between NPA and FAS 158, which captures the incremental eﬀect on
the sponsor of the recognition of NPA on the balance sheet. If the introduction of
SFAS No. 158 increased the value relevance of NPA, this interaction term should
be positive and signiﬁcant. If on the other hand the move from disclosure to
recognition did not change investors' perception of DB pensions, the coeﬃcient on
the interaction term should be zero. The coeﬃcient on the DB dummy indicates
diﬀerence in valuation between ﬁrms that sponsor a DB pension and those who
do not. A positive value implies that DB sponsors enjoy a premium valuation,
all else equal. Similarly, the interaction between the DB and FAS 158 dummies
identiﬁes if there has been a change to the relative valuation of DB sponsors after
the introduction of SFAS No. 158: a positive (negative) value implies an increase
(decrease) in the valuation of DB sponsors against ﬁrms that do not have a DB
pension.
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2.5 Samples selection and description
The main sample to investigate the value relevance of pension deﬁcits/surpluses
consists of all the ﬁrm-year observations from 2001 to 2014 available in the Compu-
stat Pension database. I then merge it with the Compustat Fundamentals Quar-
terly database to obtain the information for the accounting variables and the share
price. I delete all entries that don't have a DB scheme (companies that either have
missing data for both pension assets and liabilities, or whose PBO is zero) and
all observation with missing values to calculate independent variables. Further,
I delete all the companies with negative book value of equity. These ﬁrms are
likely to be in, or close to, ﬁnancial distress and the literature has shown that they
should be valued separately (see for instance Jan and Ou (2011)). In my robustness
analysis I ﬁnd that they have a disproportionate eﬀect on the results and, given
the public insurance on DB pensions provided by the Pension Beneﬁt Guarantee
Corporation, there are good reasons to believe that the valuation of DB pensions
is diﬀerent for sponsors close to ﬁnancial distress. As table 4.1 shows, excluding
ﬁrms with negative book value reduces the observations in my main sample by
about 5%.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main sample. As seen in
ﬁgure 2.1, the accrual on the balance sheet representing the funding of DB pensions
under SFAS No. 87 underestimates the underfunding of pension schemes in my
sample. On average it is very close to zero when divided by assets, but a signiﬁcant
number of companies recognize a surplus despite a pension scheme in deﬁcit.
I use this sample to investigate the value relevance of DB pensions' deﬁcit/surplus.
In order to focus on the eﬀect of the introduction of SFAS No. 158, I build a panel
of companies that have the full data in the years around the accounting reform. I
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Table 2.1: Samples description
Main sample Observations Firms
Compustat Pension 2001-2014 36129 4589
- without a DB scheme -8323
- missing variables -5722
- negative book value -1021
Final: main sample 21063 2590
Panel sample Observations (with DB) Firms (with DB)
Compustat Fundamentals 2001-2010 92929 (20370) 15111 (3063)
- missing at least one year -42136 (-5585)
- missing variables -17754 (-5695)
- negative book value -7679 (-920)
- assets smaller than 100M -8070 (-440)
Final: panel sample 17290 (7730) 1729 (773)
decide to stop my sample in 2010 to limit the loss of observations, as this leaves us
with ﬁve years of data under both accounting regimes. I include also companies
that do not sponsor a DB scheme as control group. For the panel sample, I keep
the same requirements as the main sample and further I eliminate all companies
that have total assets smaller than 100 million US dollars. Excluding these small
companies serves primarily to ensure that the control group of companies with no
DB scheme is not too diﬀerent from the companies sponsoring a DB. In fact this
exclusion reduces signiﬁcantly the number of ﬁrms in the control group, while it
eliminates only 44 ﬁrms that sponsor a DB pension. Including these 44 ﬁrms in
my analysis does not alter the estimates (results not reported).
Table 2.3 collects the descriptive statistics for the panel sample. The companies
that sponsor a DB pension have very similar characteristics across the two samples,
while companies without a DB scheme are on average smaller, less proﬁtable,
better capitalized and have a higher market value when standardised by assets.
The sector composition of the two groups of companies that make up my panel
sample is however quite diﬀerent. Companies with a DB scheme tend to dominate
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Table 2.2: Main sample descriptive statistics
variable N mean st dev 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
Market capitalisation 21063 0.9013 1.1160 0.2670 0.6365 1.1604
Core book value 21063 0.3756 0.3328 0.1850 0.3693 0.5268
Core earnings 21063 0.0359 0.2063 0.0081 0.0317 0.0680
Net pension assets 21063 -0.0271 0.2567 -0.0353 -0.0112 -0.0020
ON bs 7629 -0.0008 0.4216 -0.0064 0.0002 0.0087
OFF bs 7629 -0.0288 0.0497 -0.0379 -0.0101 -0.0019
NPPC 21063 -0.0024 0.0113 -0.0032 -0.0011 -0.0002
Notes: All variables are standardised by total company assets and were collected on the balance
sheet closing date, except market capitalization which was retrieved one quarter after the end of
the ﬁscal year.
Table 2.3: Panel sample descriptive statistics
DB ﬁrms N mean st dev 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
Market capitalisation 7730 0.8576 0.8036 0.2891 0.6468 1.1393
Core book value 7730 0.3582 0.2019 0.1827 0.3567 0.5011
Core earnings 7730 0.0396 0.0676 0.0110 0.0346 0.0684
Net pensions assets 7730 -0.0230 0.0436 -0.0352 -0.0126 -0.0019
ON bs 3865 0.0085 0.0356 -0.0041 0.0013 0.0139
OFF bs 3865 -0.0309 0.0471 -0.0421 -0.0147 -0.0032
NPPC 7730 -0.0023 0.0042 -0.0035 -0.0014 -0.0003
Control ﬁrms
Market capitalisation 9560 1.1301 1.2977 0.2123 0.7599 1.4991
Book value 9560 0.4255 0.2681 0.1350 0.4302 0.6429
Earnings 9560 0.0230 0.1338 0.0054 0.0228 0.0684
Notes: All variables are standardised by total company assets and were collected on the balance
sheet closing date, except market capitalization which was retrieved one quarter after the end of
the ﬁscal year.
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traditional sectors such as energy, materials and utilities, while the majority of
ﬁrms in the IT and consumer discretionary sector do not sponsor a DB pension.
To address this potential concern, I use the panel sample to match the com-
panies that sponsor a DB with a peer that does not. I mechanically pair DB
companies with a peer in the same industry group (4 digit GICS code), matching
them by size (total assets) and breaking the ties using market capitalisation. I im-
pose the constraint that no ﬁrm in the matched pair should be bigger than twice
their counterpart in 2005, the last year prior to the introduction of SFAS No. 158.
This leaves us with 302 matched pairs, for a total of 604 companies. I use these
matched companies as an additional robustness test for equation 2.3. While the
matching requirements signiﬁcantly shrink the sample, they help ensure that the
control group is indeed comparable to DB sponsors in terms of size and sector com-
position. Table 2.4 shows that the components of the matched sample are indeed
comparable: DB sponsors and control ﬁrms have very similar descriptive statistics,
diﬀering signiﬁcantly only in the dependent variable (market capitalisation).
Table 2.4: Matched sample descriptive statistics
Table presents descriptive statistics for the matched sample. It shows the mean of each
variable that I use to estimate the impact of FAS 158, analyzing DB sponsors and control
ﬁrms separately. Stars indicate signiﬁcance at conventional levels of a t test for diﬀerence
in mean.
DB sponsors control group diﬀerence t statistic
Book value 1710.52 1670.06 40.46 0.25
Core book value 1701.52 1670.06 31.46 0.19
Earnings 201.72 209.92 -8.20 -0.31
Core earnings 209.39 209.92 -0.53 -0.02
Total assets 9155.34 7510.86 1644.48 0.85
Market capitalisation 4036.46 5042.08 -1005.62** 2.39
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2.6 Results
This section presents my results on the value relevance of the net pension obligation
using the main sample, while the next subsection focuses on the impact of SFAS
No. 158. In my speciﬁcations I divide the sample using the introduction of SFAS
No. 158 as cut oﬀ date (15th December 2006) rather than identifying the eﬀect
of the introduction of the new standards with a dummy and interactions as in
Yu (2012) or Beaudoin et al. (2011). However in my case both methods yield the
same results and I provide estimates using a dummy and interactions to identify
the accounting reform in appendix 2.10.
Column 1 and 2 of table 2.5 reports the parameter estimates for the basic
Ohlson model before and after the introduction of SFAS No. 158, using only book
value and earnings as independent variables, with sector and years ﬁxed eﬀects.
Estimates for the models corresponds quite closely to those found in the literature
(see for example Hann et al. (2007a) and Dechow et al. (1999)) and my modiﬁcation
of the model to make room for pensions does not alter the estimated coeﬃcient
on either book value or earnings. Column 3 and 4 show estimation results for
equations 2.2 and 2.1 respectively. Net pension assets are not value relevant in
this part of the sample. Investors seem to focus on the accrual recognized on the
balance sheet under SFAS No. 87 accounting rather than the funding of the pension
scheme disclosed in the notes, arguably the most important piece of information
to determine future cash ﬂows to the pension fund and hence ﬁrm value. Column
5 indicates that this changed after the introduction of SFAS No. 158, in this part
of the sample NPA is strongly signiﬁcant. Its point estimate of about 2 is above
what the theory would imply, perhaps indicating that companies underestimate
the pension liability in their accounts.7 In column 5 I also ﬁnd that NPPC is
7Various articles have suggested that companies under report their pension obligations,
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Table 2.5: Value relevance of pensions under SFAS 87 and SFAS 158
Table presents my estimation results using the main sample. The independent variable is
market capitalisation one quarter after the ﬁscal year end. Core book value is book value
minus the pension deﬁcit/surplus recognized on the balance sheet, core earnings are net
income minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC, tax adjusted). Net pension assets are
the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. ON bs is the amount
recognized on the balance sheet under SFAS 87, OFF bs is NPA - ON bs . All the variables
are standardized by total company assets. All speciﬁcations include year and 4 digit industry
code dummies, standard errors are clustered at the company level. To mute outliers I exclude
the top and bottom 1% of all variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Book value 1.055*** 0.922***
(0.083) (0.069)
Earnings 4.926*** 5.153***
(0.279) (0.226)
Core book value 1.087*** 0.949*** 0.909***
(0.083) (0.081) (0.069)
Net pension assets 0.385 2.144***
(0.441) (0.309)
ON bs 1.968***
(0.494)
OFF bs -0.452
(0.433)
Core earnings 4.871*** 5.005*** 5.106***
(0.275) (0.279) (0.222)
NPPC -3.376 -6.193 -14.65***
(4.495) (4.665) (3.557)
Accounting regime SFAS 87 SFAS 158 SFAS 87 SFAS 87 SFAS 158
N 7165 12169 7165 7165 12169
R2 0.551 0.541 0.555 0.547 0.545
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value relevant, but with the wrong sign: the result implies that pension costs are
positively related to the market value of sponsors. This is due to the service cost
anomaly, ﬁrst documented in Barth et al. (1992) and later conﬁrmed by most of
the literature on DB pensions. I discuss this issue in appendix 2.8.
The results in table 2.6 conﬁrm and reinforce the insight from table 2.5. In
table 2.6 I run a battery of yearly regressions of equations 2.1 (when SFAS No.
158 is the relevant standard) and 2.2 (in the period when companies report under
SFAS No. 87). Estimating equation 2.1 before 2006 indicates that NPA is never
signiﬁcant in this period (results not reported for brevity), while the results for
equation 2.2 suggest again that investors focus on the amount recognized on the
balance sheet disregarding the disclosure in the notes, with DB pensions contribut-
ing positively to ﬁrm value even when they are in deﬁcit. From 2006 onwards, NPA
is always signiﬁcant (except for 2014) and with a coeﬃcient above 1, conﬁrming
my interpretation of the results in table 2.5.
I take these results to imply that the accounting reform introducing SFAS No.
158 and the recognition of pensions deﬁcit/surplus on the balance sheet changed
investors' perception of DB pensions. In the next subsection I turn to my panel
sample to provide additional evidence to support this claim.
2.6.1 Eﬀects of the introduction of SFAS No. 158
Using a panel of companies allows us to use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects rather than performing
a cross sectional analysis like in the previous section. Table 2.7 shows the same
estimation as table 2.5, using ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects in the panel sample,
mainly through the choice of discount rates that are too high. See for instance Kisser et al. (2017)
who discusses discount rate and mortality assumptions, and Fried and Davis-Friday (2013) that
ﬁnd evidence that companies deﬂate their liabilities after the introduction of SFAS No. 158 by
manipulating the discount rate. There is a long standing debate about which discount rate is
most appropriate for pension liabilities, see Brown and Pennacchi (2016) for a recent discussion
of the subject.
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Table 2.6: Yearly regressions
Table presents my estimation for a battery of yearly regression from my main sample, using stan-
dard errors clustered at the industry level. The independent variable is market capitalisation one
quarter after the ﬁscal year end. Core book value is book value minus the pension deﬁcit/surplus
recognized on the balance sheet, core earnings are net income minus net periodic pension cost
(NPPC, tax adjusted). Net pension assets are the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities
for each ﬁrm. ON bs is the amount recognized on the balance sheet under SFAS 87, OFF bs is
NPA - ON bs . All the variables are standardized by total company assets. All speciﬁcations
include 4 digit industry code dummies. To mute outliers I exclude the top and bottom 1% of all
variables.
BVc NPA Onbs OFFbs Ec NPPC N R2
2001 0.937*** 0.905 -0.493 5.14*** 7.004 1323 0.549
(0.187) (1.241) (1.028) (0.508) (8.589)
2002 1.013*** 1.143* -1.391** 3.947*** 4.558 1376 0.514
(0.137) (0.655) (0.606) (0.438) (5.959)
2003 1.116*** 2.601** -0.043 4.967*** -13.34 1405 0.575
(0.135) (1.157) (0.881) (0.611) (11.017)
2004 1.176*** 1.91** -0.478 4.929*** -6.442 1420 0.568
(0.157) (0.732) (0.715) (0.734) (9.141)
2005 1.191*** 2.234** -0.001 5.516*** -0.267 1438 0.58
(0.219) (0.977) (0.946) (0.72) (8.234)
2006 0.954*** 1.905** 6.663*** -10.415** 1474 0.612
(0.181) (0.855) (0.685) (4.653)
2007 0.98*** 3.518** 5.8*** -27.908*** 1456 0.578
(0.168) (1.287) (0.43) (9.641)
2008 0.768*** 1.048*** 2.963*** -8.536 1336 0.51
(0.116) (0.364) (0.273) (5.669)
2009 1.025*** 1.943*** 4.216*** -9.701 1391 0.507
(0.114) (0.615) (0.543) (6.841)
2010 0.906*** 2.886*** 5.914*** -16.358** 1378 0.565
(0.117) (0.547) (0.554) (5.954)
2011 0.738*** 1.63*** 5.828*** -16.209*** 1376 0.549
(0.123) (0.512) (0.51) (4.741)
2012 0.912*** 2.06*** 4.804*** -16.834** 1349 0.518
(0.174) (0.479) (0.541) (7.236)
2013 0.934*** 3.739*** 5.872*** -15.851*** 1315 0.589
(0.123) (0.527) (0.63) (4.149)
2014 0.623*** 0.762 6.66*** 3.177 1297 0.587
(0.154) (0.528) (0.624) (7.687)
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Table 2.7: Value relevance panel sample
Table presents my estimation results using the panel sample, using standard errors clustered
at the company level. The independent variable is market capitalisation one quarter after the
ﬁscal year end. Core book value is book value minus the pension deﬁcit/surplus recognized
on the balance sheet, core earnings are net income minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC,
tax adjusted). Net pension assets are the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for
each ﬁrm. ON bs is the amount recognized on the balance sheet under SFAS 87, OFF bs is
NPA - ON bs . All the variables are standardized by total company assets. All speciﬁcations
include year and ﬁrm dummies. To mute outliers I exclude the top and bottom 1% of all
variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Book value 1.083*** 1.057***
(0.143) (0.11)
Earnings 2.574*** 0.999***
(0.238) (0.132)
Core book value 1.088*** 1.082*** 1.035***
(0.145) (0.145) (0.112)
Net pension assets -0.48 1.581***
(0.607) (0.393)
ON bs 0.094
(1.025)
OFF bs -0.725
(-0.639)
Core earnings 2.579*** 2.588*** 1.012***
(0.239) (0.239) (0.132)
NPPC 3.497 2.218 -14.354***
(5.52) (5.643) (5.982)
Accounting regime SFAS 87 SFAS 158 SFAS 87 SFAS 87 SFAS 158
N 8171 7703 8171 8171 7703
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including all the companies.8 The small diﬀerence in the number of observation
between the pre and post SFAS No. 158 speciﬁcation is due to ﬁrms closing their
accounts before the calendar year end, so that some companies still report under
SFAS No. 87 in 2006 (my cut oﬀ date is the introduction of the standard, so the
15th of December 2006). The estimates conﬁrm that after the introduction of SFAS
No. 158 net pension assets are priced in the market value of the scheme's sponsor
and show that this results is robust to using ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀects. Comparing
the results with table 2.5, the coeﬃcient on core earnings is signiﬁcantly lower,
especially after 2006. This is due to controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, in fact the
earnings' coeﬃcients are in the same range as those estimate by Yu (2012), one of
the few papers that uses the same battery of controls. Again, comparing columns
4 and 5 with columns 1 and 2 I ﬁnd that my modiﬁcation of the Ohlson model to
make room for pensions does not unduly inﬂuence the coeﬃcients on book value
and earnings.
The main diﬀerence with table 2.5 is in column 3. In this sample, market
participants seem to disregard pensions completely before the introduction of SFAS
No. 158, while in cross section I found that the accrual recognized on the balance
sheet under SFAS No. 87 was value relevant. A possible explanation for this
diﬀerence lies in the smoothing nature of such an accrual: ON bs does not vary
much over time compared with net pensions assets, as it was designed to do. Using
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect is equivalent to subtracting each variable its mean (by company),
leaving very little variation in this variable and constraining its signiﬁcance.
A battery of yearly regressions in the panel sample9 conﬁrms the results in
the previous tables, but with one important caveat. In the year 2005 net pension
assets are value relevant and precisely estimated, almost as if SFAS No. 158 was
8Using only companies that sponsor a DB scheme does not alter the results.
9Results not reported for brevity.
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Table 2.8: The eﬀect of the introduction of SFAS No. 158
Table presents my estimation results for equation 2.3. The ﬁrst 3 columns use the panel sample,
the last three use 302 pairs of companies (with and without DB pensions) matched by sector and
assets. The independent variable is market capitalisation one quarter after the ﬁscal year end.
Core book value is book value minus the pension deﬁcit/surplus recognized on the balance sheet,
core earnings are net income minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC, tax adjusted). Net pension
assets are the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. All the variables are
standardized by total company assets, standard errors are clustered at the company level. To
mute outliers I exclude the top and bottom 1% of all variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Core book value 1.499*** 1.346*** 1.344*** 1.646*** 1.411*** 1.412***
(0.080) (0.094) (0.094) (0.155) (0.153) (0.150)
NPA 0.481 1.930*** -0.166 0.826 2.280** 0.191
(0.663) (0.469) (0.471) (1.277) (1.026) (1.002)
NPA*FAS 158 2.881*** 1.464*** 1.724*** 3.783*** 2.053** 2.409**
(0.622) (0.501) (0.499) (1.158) (0.977) (0.964)
Core earnings 4.852*** 2.434*** 2.217*** 4.559*** 2.225*** 1.991***
(0.246) (0.155) (0.156) (0.477) (0.241) (0.243)
NPPC -17.647*** -22.135*** -3.771 1.028 -31.917*** -15.472
(6.730) (4.251) (4.163) (12.841) (9.572) (9.463)
FAS 158 0.006 0.042* -0.065** -0.058 0.080* -0.045
(0.044) (0.024) (0.031) (0.077) (0.041) (0.049)
DB -0.132*** -0.142**
(0.027) (0.045)
DB*FAS 158 0.102*** 0.121*** 0.131*** 0.127*** 0.133*** 0.135***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.043) (0.039) (0.040)
Fixed eﬀects Sector, Firm, Firm, Sector, Firm, Firm,
year time trends year year time trends year
N 14265 14265 14265 4979 4979 4979
R2 0.572 - - 0.574 - -
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already mandatory.10 I believe this to be due to market participants anticipating
the eﬀect of the accounting reform, as the Financial Accounting Standards Board
made clear in November 2005 that it was going to overhaul pension accounting by
requiring the recognition on the balance sheet of the diﬀerence between pension
assets and the projected beneﬁt obligation.11 In light of this, I prefer to exclude
the year 2005 from the following estimation intended to identify the eﬀect of the
accounting reform.12
Next I turn my attention to the accounting reform and try to pin down the
introduction of SFAS No. 158. Table 2.8 presents various estimates of equation
2.3, where I identify the accounting reform using the interaction between the FAS
158 dummy and NPA, much in the spirit of a diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimation.
Columns 1 to 3 of table 2.8 report estimates using the full panel sample, while
columns 4 to 6 use 302 matched pairs of companies with and without a DB pension.
Column 1 and 4 report estimates using sector and year ﬁxed eﬀects, column 2 and
5 use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and control for time using time trends polynomia (linear,
quadratic and cubic)13 and ﬁnally column 3 and 6 use ﬁrm and years ﬁxed eﬀects.
The main variable of interest in table 2.8 is the interaction between NPA and
the FAS 158 dummy, which is always zero before the introduction of the new stan-
dard and then switches to NPA for companies that sponsor a DB scheme while
remaining at zero for the other ﬁrms. Using the full panel sample (columns 1 to 3)
the estimated coeﬃcients are in line with what I observed in the previous tables
10The eﬀect of the year 2005 might be responsible for the diﬀerence between my results and
those of Beaudoin et al. (2011). They ﬁnd that the introduction of SFAS No. 158 did not improve
the value relevance of DB pensions as these were already priced before the accounting reform,
but get to this conclusion using data from a panel of companies in years 2005 and 2006.
11See section 2.2 for a discussion of the introduction of SFAS No. 158.
12This exclusion does not have a strong impact on the estimates, but using also the data for
2005 yields weaker results.
13I use this speciﬁcation to control for time eﬀects without resorting to a full battery of years
dummies. The polynomia capture time eﬀects without absorbing as much variation as time
dummies.
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for NPA after 2006, with the magnitude of the eﬀect on ﬁrm value depending on
the controls. If instead I use a subset of companies matched by sector and size
(columns 4 to 6) the coeﬃcients estimates on my variable of interest is stronger
and signiﬁcant in all three diﬀerent speciﬁcations. On the other hand NPA seems
to be value relevant only when interacted (but for the speciﬁcations that do not
include yearly controls), reinforcing the previous ﬁnding that investors did not
value pension deﬁcits/surpluses when they were disclosed in the notes to the ﬁ-
nancial statements. Columns 1 and 4 indicate that DB sponsors are on average
less valuable than ﬁrms that do not have such pensions (the DB dummy is negative
and signiﬁcant), but this negative premium is almost completely absent after the
introduction of IAS No. 158. The coeﬃcient estimates for the other variables in
table 2.8 are very similar to what I found before, moreover there is no meaningful
diﬀerence in the estimates between the regressions that use the full panel sample
and those that focus on a subset of matched companies.
These result strengthen the result that SFAS No. 158 did indeed change
investors' perception of DB pensions, with making the recognised pension sur-
plus/deﬁcit value relevant and thus conﬁrming H2.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether there is a diﬀerence in the value relevance of
disclosed versus recognized pension liabilities. I ﬁnd that before the introduction
of SFAS No. 158 investors focused on the accrual recognized on the balance sheet,
disregarding the net position of the pension funds disclosed in the notes. As this
accrual computed under SFAS No. 87 bears little relationship with the funded
status of DB schemes, markets participants were not valuing DB plans' sponsors
correctly, often underestimating the impact of pension commitments. Investors'
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perceptions changed with the disclosure regime brought by SFAS No. 158 in 2006.
DB pension surpluses/deﬁcits are value relevant when reported on the balance
sheet. Further analysis in the years around the accounting reform suggests that
the introduction of SFAS No. 158 is indeed responsible for the increased value
relevance of pension commitments.
My analysis suggest that the FASB achieved its objective of increasing the
transparency of pension reporting and that this improved investors' valuation of
DB schemes sponsors. My results also conﬁrms and strengthens the ﬁndings of
earlier empirical studies that highlighted the incremental value relevance of rec-
ognized versus disclosed information, using a setting where there is no issue of
selection bias and where exactly the same information is disclosed or recognized.
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2.8 Appendix A1: service cost anomaly
According to the service cost anomaly, ﬁrst documented in Barth et al. (1992), the
negative sign on pensions expenses is due to service cost being a proxy for human
capital formation in the company and hence contributing positevely to ﬁrm value.
In table 2.9 I investigate if this is anomaly is driving the negative sign that I
ﬁnd for NPPC after the introduction of SFAS No. 158. Column 1 of table 2.9
is just a repetition of column 5 in table 2.5 to facilitate the comparison. Column
2 separates the elements of NPPC and shows clearly the service cost anomaly in
my data: service cost is positively related to ﬁrm value despite being a cost.14
Hann et al. (2007a) includes research and development expenses and the number
of employees as controls for human capital and shows that the anomaly disappears.
I replicate their analysis in column 3, but in my sample the inclusion of these two
controls does not have any eﬀect on the estimates for the components of NPPC. 15
An alternative strategy, used by Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et al.
(2008) is to consider service cost as a core rather than a pension expense, thus
using a measure of NPPC that includes only accruals. I replicate their method is
column 4, where service cost is included in core earnings rather than in NPPC. In
this case, the coeﬃcient on pension expenses loses its value relevance, while the
earnings coeﬃcient is little changed.16
14The small diﬀerences in sample size for the regressions in table 2.9 are due to some compo-
nents of NPPC having missing data in Compustat. Recoding this missing values to zero to use
the original sample does not change the parameters' estimates.
15Following the literature, I recoded R&D to zero for all the companies that have a missing
value in Compustat to avoid losing observations. Excluding companies with missing values
signiﬁcantly shrinks the sample without correcting the service cost anomaly.
16If I use Coronado and Sharpe (2003) treatment of service cost in the period before 2006, I
ﬁnd their very same results: before the introduction of SFAS No. 158 the net value of the pension
assets disclosed in the notes is not value relevant, while the stream of pension related earnings
is.
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Table 2.9: Service cost anomaly
Table presents my estimation results to investigate the service cost anomaly.
The independent variable is market capitalisation one quarter after the ﬁscal
year end. Core book value is book value minus the pension deﬁcit/surplus rec-
ognized on the balance sheet, core earnings are net income minus net periodic
pension cost (NPPC, tax adjusted). In the last column NPPC does not include
service cost and the core earnings variable is adjusted accordingly. Net pension
assets are the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. All
the variables but for employees are standardized by total assets. All speciﬁ-
cations include year and 4 digit industry code dummies, standard errors are
clustered at the company level.To mute outliers I exclude the top and bottom
1% of all variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Core book value 0.909*** 0.913*** 0.842*** 0.904***
(0.069) (0.07) (0.068) (0.07)
Core earnings 5.106*** 5.058*** 5.175*** 5.198***
(0.222) (0.225) (0.214) (0.23)
Net pension assets 2.144*** 2*** 2.129*** 1.295***
(0.309) (0.331) (0.317) (0.29)
NPPC -14.65*** 0.632
(3.557) 3.767
Service cost 27.139*** 23.556***
(7.164) (7.01)
Interest cost -4.473* -4.386*
(2.393) (2.301)
Other NPPC 14.684*** 14.991***
(3.902) (3.779)
R&D 4.143***
(0.476)
Employee -0.609**
(0.294)
N 12169 11884 11884 11895
R2 0.545 0.548 0.566 0.542
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2.9 Appendix B1: results by shares
This appendix presents my main results standardising all variables by the number
of shares outstanding one quarter after the ﬁscal year end rather than total assets
as in the main paper. I believe that the asset speciﬁcation is better deﬁned, suﬀers
less from problems of collinearity and its coeﬃcients have a more straightforward
economic interpretation. However various works in this literature used a standard-
isation by shares,17 so I include these results as robustness for my main estimation.
Standardising the variables by sales as in Hann et al. (2007b) or Yu (2012) yields
very similar results.
Table 2.10 presents the same speciﬁcations as table 2.5, standardising the vari-
ables by shares. In terms of signs and signiﬁcance, the results are similar to those
in table 2.5, even if the point estimates of coeﬃcients are slightly diﬀerent. The
minor diﬀerence in the number of observations in the regressions in table 2.5 and
2.10 is due to the exclusion of outliers. A slightly puzzling diﬀerence is the negative
coeﬃcient on the variable OFF bs in column 3. I believe that this is due to the
high correlation of variables describing pension schemes when these are standard-
ised by shares: ON bs and OFF bs have a correlation of nearly 0.93 before the
introduction of SFAS No. 158, while NPA and OFF bs are perfectly collinear.18
Table 2.11 presents the same estimations as table 2.7, again standardising all
variables by the number of shares outstanding one quarter after the ﬁscal year end
rather than total assets. Here almost all the coeﬃcients are statistically undistin-
guishable from the one in table 2.7, conﬁrming my inference in the main paper.
17For example Hann et al. (2007a) and Coronado and Sharpe (2003).
18I believe that these correlations are yet another reason to prefer the standardisation by
assets that I use in the main paper.
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Table 2.10: Value relevance of pensions under SFAS 87 and SFAS 158 (by share)
Table presents my estimation results using the main sample. The independent variable is market
capitalisation one quarter after the ﬁscal year end. Core book value is book value minus the
pension deﬁcit/surplus recognized on the balance sheet, core earnings are net income minus
net periodic pension cost (NPPC, tax adjusted). Net pension assets are the diﬀerence between
pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. ON bs is the amount recognized on the balance sheet
under SFAS 87, OFF bs is NPA - ON bs . All the variables are standardized by the number of
shares outstanding one quarter after the ﬁscal year end. All speciﬁcations include year and 4
digit industry code dummies, standard errors clustered at the company level. To mute outliers I
exclude the top and bottom 1% of all variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Book value 0.766*** 0.698***
(0.04) (0.034)
Earnings 4.586*** 4.835***
(0.233) (0.187)
Core book value 0.714*** 0.69*** 0.662***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.035)
Net pension assets -0.274 0.713***
(0.274) (0.242)
ON bs 1.147***
(0.337)
OFF bs -0.708***
(0.274)
Core earnings 4.55*** 4.704*** 4.757***
(0.232) (0.233) (0.185)
NPPC 1.546 -1.512 -8.846***
(2.433) (2.576) (2.632)
Accounting regime SFAS 87 SFAS 158 SFAS 87 SFAS 87 SFAS 158
N 7311 12367 7311 7311 12367
R2 0.586 0.59 0.594 0.581 0.595
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Table 2.11: Value relevance panel sample (by share)
Table presents my estimation results using the panel sample. The independent variable is market
capitalisation one quarter after the ﬁscal year end. Core book value is book value minus the
pension deﬁcit/surplus recognized on the balance sheet, core earnings are net income minus
net periodic pension cost (NPPC, tax adjusted). Net pension assets are the diﬀerence between
pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. ON bs is the amount recognized on the balance sheet
under SFAS 87, OFF bs is NPA - ON bs . All the variables are standardized by the number
of shares outstanding one quarter after the ﬁscal year end. All speciﬁcations include year and
company ﬁxed eﬀects, standard errors clustered at the company level. To mute outliers I exclude
the top and bottom 1% of all variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Book value 1.093*** 0.903***
(0.06) (0.053)
Earnings 2.222*** 1.29***
(0.162) (0.12)
Core book value 1.086*** 1.08*** 0.877***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.054)
Net pension assets 0.424 1.727***
(0.316) (0.26)
ON bs 1.146**
(0.458)
OFF bs 0.104
(0.328)
Core earnings 2.219*** 2.247*** 1.308***
(0.163) (0.162) (0.12)
NPPC -0.967 -2.441 -10.9***
(3.005) (3.032) (3.317)
Accounting regime SFAS 87 SFAS 158 SFAS 87 SFAS 87 SFAS 158
N 8387 7739 8387 8387 7739
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2.10 Appendix C1: reconciliation with previous
literature
Since Yu (2012) and Beaudoin et al. (2011) have looked at the same research
question as this paper but with a diﬀerent methodology, this section shows that
my results are robust to their estimation strategy. Both papers use a dummy for
SFAS No. 158 and its interaction with the other regressors to identify the eﬀect
on the introduction of that accounting standard. I believe that the use of a control
sample as in section 2.6.1 is more appropriate to identify such eﬀect, however for
completeness I report also estimates obtained with their technique. It involves
bringing to the data modiﬁcations of the following equation:
Mcapi,t = α + β1BV ci,t + β2NPAi,t + β3Eci,t + β4NPPCi,t + β5FAS158
+β6BV ci,t ∗ FAS158 + β7NPAi,t ∗ FAS158 + β8Eci,t ∗ FAS158
+β9NPPCi,t ∗ FAS158 +
I∑
i=1
γiIi +
T∑
t=1
γtYt + i,t
(2.4)
Where I standardise all variables by total company assets as in the main paper.
I also test a slight modiﬁcation of equation 2.4, substituting NPA with its on and
oﬀ balance sheet components when SFAS No. 87 is the relevant standard, much
like in equation 2.2. The ﬁrst two columns of table 2.12 report estimates using
my main sample and sector and year ﬁxed eﬀects, while column 3 and 4 use the
panel sample (I excluded all companies without a DB scheme as it does not make
much sense to include them using this estimation strategy) with ﬁrm and year
ﬁxed eﬀects. I report only the coeﬃcient estimates for the interactions of interest
for brevity (also, using only interactions on the pension variables rather than the
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full model does not unduly inﬂuence my results). The diﬀerent speciﬁcation in
table 2.12 all have the same interpretation, the interaction between FAS 158 and
NPA is always positive and signiﬁcant as expected, conﬁrming my claim that DB
pensions are value relevant when their net position is recognized on the balance
sheet. In columns 1 and 3, NPA is not signiﬁcant when not interacted, indicating
that market participants tend to disregard the pension deﬁcit/surplus when this is
disclosed in the notes. Column 2 and 4 support my claim that investor focused on
the pension accrual recognized on the balance sheet when valuing a DB sponsor
prior to 2006, without considering the additional disclosure in the notes to the
ﬁnancial statements.
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Table 2.12: Alternative models
Table presents my estimation for various modiﬁcation of equation 2.4, using
the main sample in columns 1 and 2 and the panel sample in columns 3 and 4.
The independent variable is market capitalisation one quarter after the ﬁscal
year end. Core book value is book value minus the pension deﬁcit/surplus
recognized on the balance sheet, core earnings are net income minus net
periodic pension cost (NPPC, tax adjusted). Net pension assets are the
diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. ON bs is the
amount recognized on the balance sheet under SFAS 87, OFF bs is NPA -
ON bs. All the variables are standardized by total assets, standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. To mute outliers I exclude the top and bottom
1% of all variables.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Core book value 1.013*** 1.099*** 1.178*** 1.228***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.135) (0.136)
NPA 0.538 0.433
(0.437) (0.471)
ON bs 2.05*** 1.22**
(0.49) (0.549)
OFF bs -0.069 0.069
(0.427) (0.509)
Core earnings 4.949*** 4.837*** 3.39*** 3.309***
(0.278) (0.274) (0.379) (0.373)
NPPC -5.171 -2.454 -4.182 -3.108
(4.671) (4.506) (5.175) (5.266)
NPA*FAS 158 1.473*** 1.966*** 1.254** 1.621***
(0.458) (0.308) (0.593) (0.414)
NPPC*FAS 158 -10.277** -13.376*** -10.037* -12.471**
(4.976) (4.915) (5.872) (6.158)
FAS158 0.022 0.054 0.127*** 0.136***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041)
Fixed eﬀects Sector, Sector, Firm, Firm,
year year year year
N 19334 19334 7039 7039
R2 0.542 0.544 - -
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Chapter 3
Discounting and the market
valuation of deﬁned beneﬁt pensions
3.1 Introduction
A deﬁned beneﬁt pension (DB) requires the sponsoring company to provide its
employees a pension, computed according to a contractually agreed beneﬁt for-
mula; this usually takes into account the employee's wage and years of service and
is indexed to inﬂation. These obligations are then ﬁnanced by a pool of pension
fund assets. Despite the fact that the pension scheme's assets and liabilities are
formally separated from the company, the shareholders are ultimately responsible
for its solvency hence pension deﬁcits/surpluses should aﬀect the ﬁrm's value. The
IAS 19 accounting standard introduced in the EU in 2006 aims to make this poten-
tial liability explicit by requiring the sponsoring ﬁrm to report any pension fund
deﬁcit/surplus on its balance sheet. Thanks to the convergence of accounting stan-
dards worldwide, the rules in the United States are very close to IAS 19 as SFAS
158, issued in 2006, prescribes the recognition of the deﬁned beneﬁt deﬁcit/surplus
on the balance sheet. Moreover, both IAS 19 and SFAS 158 introduce fair value
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accounting in the world of corporate pensions.
Whilst pension assets are fairly easy to value, the unique features of DB pension
liabilities make them problematic from an accounting perspective, as they stretch
the concept of fair value to its very limit. Pension liabilities are not quoted in
any market and their valuation depends on a wide range of unobservable inputs,
so they fall in the lowest level of the fair value hierarchy set by the IFRC, often
referred to as mark-to-model. To make things worst, pensions liabilities are by
their nature long term and depend crucially on a wide range of assumptions, such
as inﬂation, discount rate, life expectancy, salary growth, employee turnover etc.
Although UK companies have been steadily moving from deﬁned beneﬁt to
deﬁned contribution pensions, DB schemes still represent a substantial commit-
ment for most companies. Table 3.1 below presents some statistics highlighting
the importance of DB pensions in the UK indicating that in 2012 DB liabilities -
as measured under IAS 19 standards - were about 30% of market capitalization for
both the FTSE 100 and FTSE 350 and that the overall DB deﬁcit (pension assets
minus liabilities) stood at over 3% of market capitalization for both indices.1 The
sheer size of these liabilities makes them important from a valuation perspective
and there is growing evidence they have a signiﬁcant impact on the free cash ﬂow
of the parent company and its investment decisions.2
Another important insight from table 3.1 is that despite their importance,
almost all DB schemes are now closed to new members. This reﬂects the large
scale move to deﬁned contribution schemes that has occurred over the last few
1Under risk free discounting discussed below, liabilities stand at around 37% of market cap-
italization and the deﬁcit at about 11% for the FTSE 100.
2See for instance Rauh (2006) that shows how DB pensions aﬀect ﬁrms' investment in ﬁxed
assets and Liu and Tonks (2013) who look at the impact of mandatory contributions to DB
pension funds on investment and dividends for UK companies. Alderson and Betker (2009) shows
that after the burst of the dotcom bubble ﬁrms with underfunded pension scheme redirected
investment towards activities that produce higher cash ﬂow, while Duygun et al. (2017) ﬁnd
that DB coverage inﬂuences the propensity of making major investments and the type of such
investments.
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Table 3.1: DB Pension Facts
FTSE 100 FTSE 350 UK DB universe
Firms with DB scheme 77 210 6225
of which open 4 14 841
total reported DB liabilities 526.8 599.9 1329.2
as percent of market cap 29.50% 29.95% -
total reported deﬁcit 57.7 65.8 210.8
as share of market cap 3.23% 3.28% -
contributions as share of earnings 18% 18.70% -
Values at the end of 2012 ﬁscal year using IAS 19 data, but for market capitalisation, computed
at the corresponding reporting date. Data for the UK DB universe come from the Purple Book
2013. Figures are in billion pounds.
years.
In this paper I estimate the impact of pension deﬁcits/surpluses on the market
value of FTSE 100 and FTSE 350 companies. I employ a slight modiﬁcation of the
residual income model, ﬁrst proposed by Feltham and Ohlson (1995), as used in the
pension context by Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et al. (2008) that
allows to isolate the impact of pensions. As a robustness check I also use a variant
of Tobin's Q model as used by Feldstein and Seligman (1981) for US pension and
by Liu and Tonks (2010) for the UK. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
paper to investigate the issue of DB pension valuation under fair value accounting
in either the EU or US context. However, my focus is on one key aspect of pension
valuation, the discount rate used to value future of pension liabilities. Using data
available in the notes of most company accounts I create an alternative value of
liabilities based on 'risk-free' (government bond yield) discounting and compare the
market impact of pension deﬁcits/surpluses based on that measure as compared
with the published measure.
I ﬁnd that only in the case of risk-free discounting are my estimates consistent
with the prediction that a ¿1 increase in the tax-adjusted deﬁcit has a ¿1 impact
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on the value of the sponsoring company. It is also the case that model estimates
based on risk-free discounting are statistically superior and that, as expected, the
diﬀerence between the market valuation and reported value of pensions is largest
for ﬁrms with longer duration pension liabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 oﬀer a brief review
of the empirical literature about the DB pension valuation. Section 3.3 gives an
overview of the debate over the pricing of pension liabilities, focusing in particular
on the appropriate discount rate. Section 3.4 describes the techniques I employ to
investigate the pricing of DB schemes and how I adjust the discounting of pension
liabilities. The next two sections describe the data I use and present my main
results. Their robustness is discussed in section 3.7, which includes also a diﬀerent
empirical speciﬁcation using Tobin's Q model and extends my results to a wider
sample. The last section concludes.
3.2 Empirical Research on the Valuation of De-
ﬁned Beneﬁt Pension Schemes
The literature on DB pension valuation can be divided in two strands: the ﬁrst, as
in this paper, takes a market valuation approach, while the second focuses on the
impact on returns. Within this literature there is also an important issue of how
pension liabilities should be valued - particularly the appropriate discount rate. I
discuss this part of the literature in the next section. A full review of the vast and
rich literature about corporate DB scheme is outside of the scope of this paper, in
the next sections I refer to the papers that are most relevant to my work. For a
thorough discussion of the academic work on DB pension I refer to Coco (2014).
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3.2.1 Pension impact on market valuation and returns
Most papers investigating the impact of deﬁned beneﬁt pension scheme on com-
panies' valuation have focussed on the US and over the period when reporting
standard were arguably more opaque. Before the introduction of SFAS No. 158
the value of pension assets and of the projected beneﬁt obligation (PBO) were dis-
closed only in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements, while the number recognized
on the balance sheet was just an accounting accrual representing the diﬀerence
between contributions paid and costs charged to the income statement.3 The ﬁrst
set of papers taking the market valuation approach to study US DB pensions dates
back to 1980s and found that stock prices fully reﬂected the funding situation of
the pension plan. The main examples in this literature are the works by Feldstein
and Seligman (1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983) and Bulow et al. (1987). These
papers take a transparent view of the pension plan, meaning that pension assets
and liabilities are considered as part of the sponsoring company and thus should
be taken into account when valuing the ﬁrm.
Later work by Gold (2005) put forward a diﬀerent theoretical position (named
the opaque view) expressing scepticism about investors' ability to pierce the
accounting veil and value DB schemes correctly. The relevant accounting standard
for the US at the time was SFAS No. 87, which prescribed the disclosure of
the pension related information only in the notes. The only way in which the
pension plan had an eﬀect on the sponsoring company's ﬁnancial statements was
through its earnings component. Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et al.
(2008) tested empirically Gold's theory, ﬁnding that investors and analysts seem
to ﬁxate on the earnings impact of DB pensions and disregard the net position of
the pension plans disclosed in the notes. Work by Hann et al. (2007a) is somewhat
3This was also the case in the UK prior to the introduction of IAS 19.
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in between, arguing that both earnings and the pension plan net position are taken
into account by market participants. Looking at the returns approach, Franzoni
and Marin (2006) ﬁnd that companies with severely underfunded pension plans
earn signiﬁcantly lower returns, controlling for a set of other factors; they argue
that pension deﬁcits impacts companies' proﬁtability with a lag. Their ﬁndings
are reinforced by Picconi (2006) work, which shows that analysts systematically
fail to take into account the eﬀect of DB pensions in forecasting earnings. Jin et al.
(2006) take a slightly diﬀerent approach, focusing on the risk that a pension plan
adds to the sponsoring company; they observe that for ﬁrms with normal leverage
ratios the risk of pension liabilities is similar to that of corporate debt, whereas the
portion of plan's assets invested in equities (or similar securities) has a signiﬁcantly
higher risk proﬁle. Using a model much in the spirit of the CAPM they ﬁnd that
ﬁrms' betas reﬂect the additional risk generated by the DB scheme's assets and
liabilities. Choy et al. (2014) ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms are comfortable taking more
risks after freezing their deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, increasing research and
development expenses and leverage.
The literature on DB schemes for European countries is much scarcer. Fasshauer
and Glaum (2012) investigate the issue in the German context, where most of the
schemes are unfunded, using the Ohlson model and ﬁnd support for the transpar-
ent view. Liu and Tonks (2010) use UK data, testing both a market valuation
model and the asset price approach; they ﬁnd that pension deﬁcits reduce the
market value of the sponsoring ﬁrm but less than one-for-one. A similar result is
found by McKillop and Pogue (2009), who also ﬁnd that pension deﬁcits have an
impact on credit ratings. Cardinale (2007) focuses on the bond market and ﬁnds
that pension deﬁcits have a non-monotonic impact on credit spreads, for both the
UK and the US. It should however be noted that these works on the UK use data
before 2006 and the implementation of IAS 19, which signiﬁcantly increased the
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transparency in pension accounting. The change in accounting standard could be
responsible for the diﬀerent results that I ﬁnd in this paper, but I don't address
this question directly as my sample starts in 2006.
3.3 Discounting of Pension Liabilities
Although both IAS 19 in Europe and SFAS No. 158 in the US prescribe that the
pension liabilities should be recognized at their fair value in the sponsoring com-
pany's balance sheet, there are a number of assumptions in that process that have
been criticised. Given their long duration probably the single most important of
these debated assumptions is the discount rate used to estimate the present value
of those liabilities. This debate is summarised in Brown and Pennacchi (2016)
who demonstrate that, whilst it is appropriate for the future pension recipient to
include some measure of default risk when valuing their future pension beneﬁts,
from the sponsoring ﬁrm's point of view the pension liability has no default risk
and so should be valued without allowing for credit risk (in practice government
bond yields). In other words, Brown and Pennacchi (2016) argue that the appro-
priate discount rate for pension liabilities depends on the objective of the valuation
exercise. The risk-free rate should always be used to measure the funding of a pen-
sion scheme, while a discount rate reﬂecting the risk of the sponsoring company is
appropriate when measuring the market value of the company's pension promises.
Novy-Marx (2015) stresses a similar point, arguing that the valuation of pension
liabilities depends on both the concept of liability being used and from whose point
of view the liabilities are valued.
To see why pension liabilities should be discounted using a risk-free rate it
is useful to split the process of their determination in two parts. The ﬁrst is
estimation, where the schedule of future pension payments is computed using a
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range of actuarial assumptions that depend upon the speciﬁc situation of each DB
scheme and the demographics of its participants. Once the future cash outﬂows of
the pension fund have been estimated, they need to be discounted to compute the
projected beneﬁt obligation (PBO) that the sponsoring company has to fund and
disclose in its ﬁnancial statements. The discount rate used in this exercise should
be determined considering the risk of these future payments from the sponsor's
standpoint. The future beneﬁt payments are however certain from this perspective,
at least in regard to credit risk.4 Hence it seems clear that the appropriate discount
rate from the sponsoring ﬁrm's perspective should not reﬂect any credit risk.
In the US context (where the focus has been more on the valuation of public
DB schemes) a number of papers, most notably Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) and
Brown and Wilcox (2009), discuss the correct discount rate for pension liabilities,
and argue that a credit risk free-rate is appropriate. Fabozzi (2015) focuses on the
investment policy and liability valuation concept of the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty
Corporation, maintaining that a correct valuation of liability is key to design an
optimal investment strategy and arguing the this valuation should be done using
risk-free rates for both public and private pension plan sponsors. Kisser et al.
(2017) ﬁnd evidence that US corporate DB scheme manipulate reported pension
liabilities, underestimating them by approximately 10 per cent on average, mainly
using discount rates that are higher than appropriate. Also Comprix and Muller
(2011) ﬁnd that companies are opportunistic in choosing the discount rate and
other assumptions, providing evidence that ﬁrms use them to exaggerate pension
commitments before freezing beneﬁts.
Despite the academic consensus that the discount rate should not allow for
credit risk, both IAS 19 and SFAS No. 158 allow discounting using corporate
4The only way in which a company could reduce the burden of future pension payment is to
renegotiate the contributions or beneﬁts of the pension scheme's participant. This is eﬀectively
equivalent to a salary cut.
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bond yields that are signiﬁcantly above those of government bonds due, largely, to
perceived credit risk. Under both standards, the pension obligation is discounted
using high quality corporate bonds yields; most of the companies interpret this
provision as AA rated corporate bonds of currency and duration matching those
of their pension obligation.5 There is however a long standing debate about which
discount rate should be used.6 Indeed there is some apparent contradiction within
IAS 19 itself as to the nature of the discount rate. Paragraph 83 and 84 of the last
version of IAS 19 read as follows:
83. The rate used to discount post-employment beneﬁt obligations
(both funded and unfunded) shall be determined by reference to market
yields at the end of the reporting period on high quality corporate
bonds. (...) 84. One actuarial assumption that has a material eﬀect is
the discount rate. The discount rate reﬂects the time value of money
but not the actuarial or investment risk. Furthermore, the discount
rate does not reﬂect the entity-speciﬁc credit risk borne by the entity's
creditors, nor does it reﬂect the risk that future experience may diﬀer
from actuarial assumptions.7
Paragraph 84 seems to suggest the use of a risk-free rate, contradicting the previous
provision. In fact, the interpretation committee of the IFRS has been requested
to clarify the passage above and the amendment for paragraphs 83-84 proposed by
the IFRS' staﬀ explicitly mentions credit risk:
The objective of the discount rate is to reﬂect only the time value of
money and at most very low credit risk, the currency and the estimated
5The wording of the two accounting standards is slightly diﬀerent, but their practical imple-
mentation has been identical in both countries.
6See Napier (2009) for a discussion.
7IASB (2011)
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term of the post-employment beneﬁt obligations. The discount rate
does not reﬂect the actuarial or investment risk of the plan assets (as
deﬁned in paragraph 28). Furthermore, the discount rate does not
reﬂect the entity-speciﬁc credit risk borne by the entity's creditors,
and nor does it reﬂect the risk that future experience may diﬀer from
actuarial assumptions.8
Even in this formulation it remains unclear why the discount rate should reﬂect
at most very low credit risk since pension liabilities are not subject to such risk
from the ﬁrm's perspective.
Unsurprisingly, the decision to use a discount rate that reﬂects some credit risk
is not uncontroversial in the accounting industry. Among others, the Accounting
Standard Board (ASB), the former British accounting standard setter, has recom-
mended in a discussion paper (Pro-Active Accounting Activities in Europe, 2008)
that this obligation should be discounted at a (credit) risk-free rate. A similar
position has been expressed also by Blake et al. (2008) in a report authored by the
Pension Institute. The most striking fact is perhaps that the UK Pension Regu-
lator and the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) use government bond yields rather
than corporate bond rates as a basis for discounting deﬁned beneﬁt obligations
in their annual publication investigating the DB universe (the Purple Book) and
in calculating the levy that each sponsor has to pay to fund the PPF's guaran-
tee. The last revision of IAS 19 could have incorporated these suggestions, but
the IASB preferred to oblige the companies to disclose a sensitivity analysis of
the pension obligation to various assumption used in its determination, including
the discount rate, to provide the users of ﬁnancial statements with a measure of
the risk underlying the DB obligation. This change became mandatory from 2013
8IFRS (2013)
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onwards.
Of course, although it is hard to justify allowing for credit risk when estimat-
ing the present value of pension liabilities, it is possible that other considerations
mean that the eﬀective discount rate need not be the yield on government bonds.
The literature (e.g.Brown and Wilcox, 2009) highlight two important diﬀerences
between government bonds and pension liabilities that may make bond yields inap-
propriate for discounting DB liabilities. First, government bonds are signiﬁcantly
more liquid than pension liabilities as although the latter can be traded it is a com-
plex process unlike government bonds that are easily traded in an active secondary
market. This liquidity premium would tend to mean that the yield on government
bonds is too low a rate for discounting pension liabilities. Second, since pension
liabilities tend to be at least partially indexed to inﬂation, they have a lower in-
ﬂation risk premium than nominal government bonds (see Breedon and Chadha,
2003 and Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2005 for evidence on the inﬂation risk premium in
nominal bonds). Thus the yield on nominal government bonds may be too high
a rate for discounting pension liabilities (sadly I have too little information on in-
dexing to estimate the present value of real liabilities using inﬂation indexed bond
yields). Since there is no consensus on the scale of either of these eﬀects (and they
work in opposite directions), I follow the approach of previous papers and take
government bond yields as the best measure available.9
A recent working paper by Anantharaman and Henderson (2016) tackles em-
pirically the issue of discount rate for pension liabilities, confronting AA corporate
bond rate, risk-free rate and the expected return on plan's assets. They ﬁnd that
discounting at the expected return on pension assets provides the best ﬁt in ex-
plaining both equity values and credit ratings (for ﬁnancially healthy ﬁrms). The
diﬀerent result I ﬁnd in this paper could be due to diﬀerence in samples, as Anan-
9I discuss other factors that may inﬂuence this calculation in the appendix.
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tharaman and Henderson (2016) focus on US ﬁrms and start their analysis in
1995. Another explanation could be in the diﬀerent method they use to estimate
the sensitivity of the pension obligation to changes in the discount rate. They
rely on actuarial gains and losses for this estimation, discarding more than 60% of
data in the process, while I rely on the sensitivity analysis disclosed by ﬁrms as
described in section 3.4.1.
3.4 Model Speciﬁcation and hypothesis develop-
ment
The main model I employ to investigate empirically the valuation of DB pension
scheme is a parsimonious speciﬁcation of the residual income model, put forward
by Feltham and Ohlson (1995). In their model the market value of a ﬁrm's equity
is expressed as the sum of the value emanating from the company's non-ﬁnancial
core activities plus the unrelated ﬁnancial activities. I modify this model to make
room for pensions as in Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et al. (2008),
dividing both income statement and balance sheet variables into pension and non-
pension components. This model expresses the market value of equity (Mcap)
as a function of the core book value of equity (BVc) deﬁned as the book value of
equity minus the net pension assets (NPA). Net pension assets in turn represent the
economic deﬁcit/surplus of the DB pension schemes of the company; I deﬁne them
as pension assets minus pension liabilities, not taking into account any surplus
restriction, minimum funding liability, corridor adjustment or deferred tax asset
arising under the current accounting standard. As noted earlier, although entering
pension assets and liabilities separately into the model rather than the net position
might be useful for my analysis, the high correlation between the two items means
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it is not practical to do so.
Regarding income statement variables, I divide earnings into core earnings (Ec)
deﬁned as net earnings minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC) and NPPC itself.
The NPPC collects all the pension related entries in the income statement: service
cost (beneﬁts accrued during the accounting period), interest cost (the eﬀect of
time on the pension obligation), expected return on plan's assets and temporary
events such as curtailment and settlements.10 Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and
Coronado et al. (2008) use a slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition of NPPC, where service
cost is considered as a core expense rather that a pension item. I prefer to aggregate
all the pension variables, but changing this deﬁnition has no major eﬀect on the
results. Hence I bring to the data the following models, where all variables are
standardized by total company assets to make the series stationary and reduce
heteroskedasticity:
Mcapi,t = α+
10∑
s=1
γsSs + β1BV ci,t + β2NPAi,t + β3Eci,t + β4NPPCi,t + i,t (3.1)
Mcapi,t = α+
75∑
i=1
γiIi + β1BV ci,t + β2NPAi,t + β3Eci,t + β4NPPCi,t + i,t (3.2)
where the only diﬀerence between the two speciﬁcation is given by the ﬁxed eﬀects,
which I include at either the sector of company level.11
As contributions to the pension fund are tax deductible in the UK, my esti-
mates are based on a tax adjusted NPA that adds back the associated deferred
tax asset/liability. I compute this as NPA times the corporation tax rate that the
10Excluding these exceptional events altogether does not alter my results.
11I use the Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS) and take the broadest sectoral
deﬁnition, using 10 diﬀerent sectors in total.
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companies in my sample face every year.12 Although I do not directly observe
the marginal tax rate paid by companies, the fact that the average tax rate paid
by my sample of companies is about 24% it seems reasonable to assume that my
ﬁrms face a marginal tax rate equal to or very close to the corporation tax rate.
As Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) provide evidence that ﬁrms incorporate the
tax implication of DB pensions in their capital structure decisions, so disregarding
the tax credit associated with pension contributions could limit the validity of my
results. However, as a robustness check the appendix includes estimates based on
unadjusted NPA.
I use the models above to test two separate hipotheses. The ﬁrst concerns the
value relevance of DB pensions:
H1: The net position of DB pension funds is value relevant
If H1 holds, I expect the coeﬃcient on NPA to be positive and signiﬁcant.
Considering that I adjust NPA for the associated tax credit, theory suggests that
its coeﬃcient should be equal to 1-t, where t is the marginal tax rate that companies
face (so in my case it should be around 0.75). A higher (lower) coeﬃcient would
indicate that investors overreact (undereact) to DB pensions' deﬁcits/surpluses.
On the other hand, a coeﬃcient of zero on NPA would indicate that H1 does not
hold.
The second hypothesis concerns the estimation of the present value of pension
liabilities. As discussed in section 3.3, ﬁnancial theory suggests that pension lia-
bilities should be discounted using a discount rate that reﬂects just the time value
of money and does not allow for any credit risk. This is in contrast with the provi-
sions of IAS 19 that mandate companies to use high quality corporate bond yields
for such discounting. Formally I test the following hypothesis:
12UK Corporation tax has been changing during the period that I take as my sample, starting
at 30% and being lowered ﬁrst to 28% in 2009, then to 26% in 2011 and ﬁnally to 24% in 2012.
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H2: Do investors use risk-free discounting rather than AA corporate
bond rates when discounting pension liabilities?
Sice using risk-free discounting pension deﬁcits are substantially bigger than
the reported amounts, I expect the coeﬃcient on NPA to be higher than 0.75 in
equation (3.1) and (3.2) if H2 holds. Conversely, the coeﬃcient on risk-free NPA
in the same equations should be around 1 if H2 holds. In equation (3.4) I explicitly
include the adjustment due to risk-free discounting alongside NPA in my model,
so if H2 holds the coeﬃcients on these two variables should both be around 1. The
next section illustrates how I adjust pension liabilities using risk-free discounting.
3.4.1 Estimating risk-free pension liabilities
As discussed in section 3.3 an important question mark over pension liabilities as
they are reported in company accounts is the discount rate used to create their
present value. In this section I describe how I adjust that valuation such that
liabilities are discounted at the 'risk-free' rate - the yield on UK gilts. Although
not required to do so over my sample, most of the companies in the FTSE 100
disclose a sensitivity analysis to help users of ﬁnancial statements understand the
impact of the assumptions used in calculating the pension obligation. However for
my sample almost none of the ﬁrms in the FTSE 350, other than those in the FTSE
100, report this information. It is for this reason I conduct most of my analysis
on the FTSE 100, though I report some more limited results for the FTSE 350 in
section 3.7.
I use the interest rate sensitivity analysis to compute the duration of the deﬁned
beneﬁt obligation; this in turn allows me to ﬁnd the corresponding gilt rate appro-
priate for that liability and allows me to calculate the value of pension liabilities
under 'risk free' discounting; I label the resulting estimate risk-free pension liabil-
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ities and obtain the associated Risk-free NPA by subtracting it from the reported
pension assets (as these are already marked-to-market, no adjustment is neces-
sary).13 The formula used in both passages above is just the standard duration
approximation:
∆P
P
= − ∆i
1 + i
D (3.3)
The duration of the pension obligation averages about 18 years, with a median
very close to it but with wide variation over a span of more than 15 years; half of
the companies are within the 15 to 20 year range. Most of the companies do not
disclose consistently the sensitivity analysis of the pension obligation to changes in
interest rates. To solve this problem, I impute the duration of missing years to be
equal to the closest available one. About a third of companies in my main sample
do not report any sensitivity so for these ﬁrms I need to use values reported in
years outside my sample (this disclosure became mandatory in 2013). However,
pension liabilities are of very long term nature and since almost all schemes are
closed to new members I can make a relatively accurate estimate of duration for all
other years based on standard assumptions. The alternative approach of dropping
these observations delivers similar results (albeit with larger standard errors).14
The yields on UK gilts come from the Bank of England historical yield curve
data; in adjusting the pension liabilities, I retrieved the yields at the balance
sheet closing date. Changing the discount rate of the pension liability to the gilt
rate increases the size of the pension commitment considerably. On average the
increase amounts to more than 20 per cent of the reported liability. Under risk-
free discounting, only ﬁve companies have posted a surplus in at least one year
13I did not adjust NPA to account for the deferred tax credit/debit that they generate in this
section. I choose not to present the results with both adjustments as they are nearly identical to
the ones in this section.
14These results are available in the appendix.
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and none has had a consistent surplus throughout my sample period. The median
company has deﬁcit totalling more than 5 per cent of assets.
3.5 Dataset Construction and Summary Statistics
My main dataset includes all the FTSE 100 constituents with a deﬁned beneﬁt pen-
sion scheme.15 It spans from 2006, the ﬁrst year when IAS 19 became mandatory,
until 2012, when the revised version of IAS 19 became mandatory. I decided not
to include the data from 2013 onwards as this revision could signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
my results and so I preferred to have a homogeneous sample.
To deal with the wide variation in balance sheet closing dates, I deﬁned time
in my sample as ﬁscal year, i.e. all the companies closing their accounts from
May 2008 to April 2009 are considered in year 2008. All the pension related
variables have been hand-collected from the notes to the ﬁnancial statements. The
rest of the companies account data have been retrieved from Bloomberg, using
the balance sheet closing date as reference; for companies that do not use pound
sterling as reporting currency, the data have been converted in pounds using the
closing exchange rate at the balance sheet date. The market capitalisation of each
company has been retrieved at the reporting date instead of the balance sheet
date, focusing on when the ﬁnancial statements became publicly available. This
leaves me with 83 companies that have a DB scheme for at least one of the years
in my main sample of FTSE 100;16 I drop two of them (Burberry and Lonmin)
because their DBs were demerged or wound up in 2008. I also drop Fresnillo and
15Recall that I use the FTSE 100 for the main part of the paper because the pension reporting
- particularly of interest rate sensitivity is superior to that of the FTSE 250. I present results for
the FTSE 350 in section 3.7.
16During this period there was a major merger between British Airways and Iberia. For the
sake of dataset construction, I consider the resulting company (International Airlines Group) as
a new ﬁrm that takes the place of BA.
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Vedanta Resources because they do not have any DB scheme in Europe or the
United States, but only very small arrangements in developing countries.17 I also
drop four companies that do not disclose any duration or sensitivity analysis in
any of their accounts (including them with duration ﬁxed at the sample mean or
median does not inﬂuence the results). These exclusions do not aﬀect my results
in any material way.
Given that for some companies I don't have the full seven years of data, my
main dataset includes 511 observations. Table 3.2 below summarizes the variables
used in the estimation for the main sample of FTSE 100 ﬁrms, already standardized
by assets. The main variable of interest for this study, net pension assets, averages
at about - 2.8 per cent of assets, but the distribution is considerably skewed to the
right so the median company has a deﬁcit of only 1.1 per cent. Also the distribution
of pension liabilities is skewed to the right, with some supersized pension funds
pushing the mean up to 30 per cent. For the median company pension liabilities
represent about 19 per cent of assets, but in some cases the pension fund is actually
bigger than the company itself. Obviously using a risk free rate to discount pension
liabilities increases their size considerably. Non pension earnings average 6.5 per
cent of assets, while the direct impact of DB schemes on the sponsoring ﬁrms'
income statement is very modest as testiﬁed by NPPC. Moreover, nearly 15 per
cent of my sample's companies are actually booking negative pension expenses,
with the DB scheme contributing to ﬁrm proﬁtability despite being in deﬁcit in
some cases. I should however note that a great deal of these proﬁts comes from
settlements and curtailments related to the restructuring of the pension fund.
17In 2012 their combined pension liabilities were under 100m ¿, less than 0.2 per cent of the
whole liabilities of FTSE 100 constituents.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
variable N mean standard dev 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
Market Capitalisation 511 0.9416 0.7420 0.4223 0.7560 1.3519
Core Book Value 511 0.3355 0.1821 0.1918 0.3535 0.4859
Net Pension Assets 511 -0.0207 0.0378 -0.0288 -0.0077 -0.0009
Pension Liabilities 511 -0.3048 0.4159 -0.3606 -0.1939 -0.0400
Risk-free NPA 511 -0.0986 0.1311 -0.1124 -0.0626 -0.0127
Risk-free PL 511 -0.3750 0.5028 -0.4689 -0.2432 -0.0496
Core Earnings 511 0.0644 0.0722 0.0213 0.0615 0.0958
NPPC 511 -0.0028 0.0054 -0.0045 -0.0018 -0.0003
All variables are standardised by total company assets and were collected on the balance sheet
closing date, except market capitalization which was retrieved at the reporting date.
3.6 Estimation and Results
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3.3 reports the parameter estimates for the basic Ohlson
model, using only book value and earnings as independent variables, with sector
and company ﬁxed eﬀects. Estimates for the model with sector ﬁxed eﬀects cor-
responds quite closely to those found in the US literature (see for example Hann
et al., 2007a and Dechow et al., 1999) even though the book value coeﬃcient is not
signiﬁcant in my case (though it is when I include FTSE 250 companies as in table
3.6). The use of company ﬁxed eﬀects is less common on the literature since the
ﬁrm level dummies often pick up some of the impact of book value and earnings
making the coeﬃcients on those variables more diﬃcult to interpret, despite this
the coeﬃcients on this model are both signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient
estimates that I get with company ﬁxed eﬀects are much closer to the Ohlson's
model implied values that Dechow et al. (1999) ﬁnd assuming a 12% cost of capital
and using the realized persistence of abnormal earnings, suggesting that company
ﬁxed eﬀects absorb some of this persistence. Column 3 and 4 show my results for
Equation (3.1) and (3.2) with net pension assets. A comparison of column 1 with
3 and 2 with 4 shows that my modiﬁcation of the Ohlson model to make room for
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pensions does not have a big impact on the estimated coeﬃcients on book value
and earnings. Although NPA is only marginally signiﬁcant in the sector dummy
case, both speciﬁcations seem to give some support to the transparent view that
net pension assets inﬂuence market valuation. The estimated coeﬃcient on pension
expenses is quite noisy. Indeed, in some speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient on pension
earnings is signiﬁcant but negative. This is due to the service cost anomaly, a fact
well documented in the literature:18 eﬀectively service cost expenses are a proxy
for human capital formation and hence can contribute positively to the value of
the company.
Although it is positive and signiﬁcant as the transparent view of pension ac-
counting would predict, the coeﬃcient on NPA in column 3 is puzzling as it is
consistently larger than one implying that the market gives a disproportionate
weight to pension deﬁcits, with ¿1 of net pension deﬁcit reducing the market value
of the company by about ¿2. Although this result is not present in the spec-
iﬁcations where I include ﬁxed eﬀects at the company level (Column 4) this is
unsurprising since the discount rate eﬀect I discuss below is mitigated by the ﬁrm
level ﬁxed eﬀects. In eﬀect, since the diﬀerence between Risk-free NPA and the
reported value depends on the absolute size of pension liabilities and their duration
and these two variables are speciﬁc to every company and move slowly through
time, in these speciﬁcations their eﬀect is likely to be captured at least partially
by the company dummies.
In all the speciﬁcations in table 3.3 I decided to cluster the standard errors at
the sector level since this is the least restrictive assumption about the correlation
of the errors themselves. However, this is problematic with my data. Clustered
standard errors are unbiased when the number of clusters approaches inﬁnity and in
my setup I have only ten sectors. Moreover each sector has a diﬀerent size in terms
18See for example Hann et al., 2007a.
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of number of observations, further compounding the problem of over-rejection of
the null hypothesis. Of the various bootstrap based improvements proposed by the
literature I choose to use the wild cluster bootstrap of t-statistics as in Cameron
et al. (2008) since this method corrects for both the small number of clusters and
the unequal cluster size.19 Signiﬁcance levels based on the wild bootstrap are
presented in the appendix along with further details of the procedure. Overall, the
bootstrap results are similar to those presented in table 3.3.
3.6.1 Risk-free pension liabilities: results
I now compare the estimates of the impact of pension deﬁcits using my alternative
measure 'risk-free' measure described in section 3.4.1. First, I re-estimate Equation
(3.1) using gilt discounted liabilities. As column 1 in table 3.4 shows on this basis
the coeﬃcient on net pension assets is now more precisely estimated and within the
predicted range and column 2 shows that this result is robust to ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
as in Equation (3.2). As in the previous estimation, I cluster the standard errors at
the sector level and use the wild cluster bootstrap of t-statistics to obtain reliable
inference (see appendix for details of the bootstrap results which are similar to
table 3.4.1). Of course, these estimates do not necessarily indicate that it is the
change in discounting that explains the higher than expected estimates that I ﬁrst
observed, so in column 3 I separate the NPA and the additional component due
to the gilt adjustment, creating a variable named Adjustment (Adj) deﬁned as
19Clearly another possible solution is to make more restricting assumption about the corre-
lation of the errors. Allowing them to be correlated only at ﬁrm level or using robust standard
errors improves the precision of the results in table 3.3 without changing the interpretation of
the results. I provide estimates using clustering at the ﬁrm level for most of my speciﬁcations in
the appendix.
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Table 3.3: Residual income model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Book Value 0.526 1.490***
(0.427) (0.321)
Earnings 5.043** 2.019***
(1.633) (0.525)
Core Book Value 0.480 1.591***
(0.413) (0.420)
NPA 1.964* 1.115***
(0.978) (0.326)
Core Earnings 5.018** 2.113***
(1.642) (0.558)
NPPC 2.302 -5.689*
(3.739) (2.603)
Fixed Eﬀects Sector Company Sector Company
N 511 511 511 511
R2 0.575 - 0.578 -
Table presents results using the main FTSE 100 sample, stretching from
2006 to 2012. The independent variable is market capitalisation at the
reporting date. Core book value is book value minus net pension assets,
core earnings are net income minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC),
the measure of pension-related earnings in income. Net pension assets are
the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. All the
variables are standardized by total company assets. When imposing ﬁxed
eﬀect at the sector level, I use the broadest GISC sector classiﬁcation with
10 sectors in total. The standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
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Risk-free NPA - NPA which amounts to testing the following:
Mcapi,t = α+
75∑
i=1
γiIi+β1BV ci,t+β2NPAti,t+β3Adji,t+β4Eci,t+β5NPPCi,t+i,t
(3.4)
.
Both the coeﬃcients on NPA and on the adjustment are signiﬁcant and very
close to what I found for the risk-free net pension assets. Finally in column 4 I
test directly the prediction that companies with long duration liabilities should
see a larger coeﬃcient on their reported liabilities. I deﬁne a new variable called
Ddif, equal to the duration of each company's pension liabilities minus the average
duration across the sample, and interact it with pension liabilities.20 This amounts
to testing:
Mcapi,t = α +
10∑
s=1
γsSs + β1BV ci,t + β2PLi,t + β3Ddifi,t + β4PLxDdifi,t + β5Eci,t
+β6NPPCi,t + i,t
(3.5)
which I do in column 4. The interaction sign is signiﬁcant and has the predicted
sign, indicating that ﬁrms with longer duration liabilities have a larger coeﬃcient
on reported pension deﬁcits. In this speciﬁcation I only use ﬁxed eﬀects at the
sector level as this is a test of the cross-section properties of pension liabilities.
Overall, my results suggest that risk-free discounting is the most plausible ex-
planation for the higher than expected impact of pension deﬁcits on market valua-
20Using NPA or the accounting deﬁcit for the interaction yield results with the same interpre-
tation.
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Table 3.4: Risk-free pension liabilities
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Core Book Value 0.442 1.627*** 1.623*** 0.428 1.624***
(0.409) (0.457) (0.382) (0.236) (0.380)
Risk-free NPA 1.038*** 1.010*** 1.020***
(0.230) (0.177) (0.375)
Core Earnings 5.078** 2.028*** 2.034*** 5.175*** 2.029***
(1.638) (0.544) (0.741) (1.190) (0.732)
NPPC -1.994 -4.338 -4.254 -1.601 -4.292
(3.516) (2.851) (6.700) (7.612) (6.705)
NPA 1.336** -0.043
(0.660) (0.732)
Risk-free Adjustement 0.963**
(0.368)
Pension Liabilities 0.392**
0.15203
Duration Diﬀerence 0.029**
(0.014)
Ddiﬀ*Pension Liabilities 0.058**
(0.029)
Fixed Eﬀects Sector Company Company Sector Company
N 511 511 511 511 511
R2 0.592 - - 0.594 -
Table presents results using net pension assets discounted at a risk-free rate (UK gilt yields). The
independent variable is market capitalisation at the reporting date. Core book value is book value
minus net pension assets, core earnings are net income minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC),
the measure of pension-related earnings in income. Adjustment is deﬁned as Risk-free NPA
minus reported NPA. Duration diﬀerence is the duration of pension liabilities minus its average
across the sample. All the variables but duration diﬀerence are standardized by total company
assets. Fixed eﬀect at the sector level are based on the broadest GISC sector classiﬁcation with
10 sectors in total. The standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
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tion, not least since the eﬀect seems larger for ﬁrms with longer duration liabilities.
3.6.2 Model selection tests
Testing econometrically whether the model with Risk-free NPA is preferable to
the model using the accounting NPA is problematic in my framework as the two
models are non-nested. I use two approaches to test which model is preferred.
First, I use the Vuong (1989) test statistic, as Hann et al. (2007b) do in this
literature. Vuong (1989) is a likelihood based test statistic that allows to compare
the explanatory power of non-nested econometric models. It does indeed conﬁrm
that the risk-free model is better speciﬁed, preferring it to the speciﬁcation with
reported NPA at the 5% conﬁdence level using sector ﬁxed eﬀects, while the test
statistic is just shy of signiﬁcance at the conventional level using company ﬁxed ef-
fects. Second, I eﬀectively force the two models to be nested by running a regression
with both Risk-free NPA and NPA as independent variables. I do this in column 5
of table 3.4, where Risk-free NPA completely dominates its reported counterpart:
the coeﬃcient and standard errors on Risk-free NPA are almost unchanged from
what I present in columns 1 and 2 of table 3.4 whilst NPA is insigniﬁcant and has
a coeﬃcient very close to zero.
Therefore for both approaches it seems that pension deﬁcit based on risk-free
discounting dominated the reported deﬁcit in terms of ﬁnancial market impact.
3.7 Extensions
This section presents a set of extensions to my basic results that aim to conﬁrm
the validity of my results. First, I extend my sample to the full FTSE 350, though
the lack of liability duration data for the smaller ﬁrms means I cannot recalculate
pension liabilities using a risk-free rate. Second I use Tobin's Q model rather than
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the residual income model as the basis of my estimation. Further extensions are
presented in the appendices.
3.7.1 FTSE 350 ﬁrms
In the extended sample of FTSE 350 constituents I have 215 ﬁrms with a deﬁned
beneﬁt pension scheme for at least one year in my sample. The disclosure of
ﬁrms in the FTSE 250 is not as comprehensive as that of the constituents of the
FTSE 100, so for those ﬁrms I could not work out the duration of the pension
obligation and hence the discount rate adjustment. I drop all the observations
that have a negative book value of equity together with two ﬁrms that experienced
exceptional circumstances during the years that I consider in my sample, namely
Howden Joinery and ITV. This leaves me with 1408 ﬁrm-year observations.
As table 3.5 shows, the FTSE 250 sample is remarkably similar to the FTSE
100 for the variables that I consider, even if the pension commitments of companies
in companies in the FTSE 250 are only a fraction of those of their bigger peers.21
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics for FTSE 350
variable N mean standard dev 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
Market Capitalisation 1408 0.9695 0.8556 0.4376 0.7487 1.2665
Core Book Value 1408 0.3881 0.1904 0.2621 0.3893 0.5205
Net Pension Assets 1408 -0.0201 0.0369 -0.0305 -0.0900 -0.0007
Pension Liabilities 1408 -0.2826 0.3470 -0.3896 -0.1729 -0.0399
Core Earnings 1408 0.0624 0.0796 0.0259 0.0570 0.0928
NPPC 1408 -0.0020 0.0068 -0.0036 -0.0013 -0.0001
All variables are standardised by total company assets and were collected on the balance sheet
closing date, except market capitalization which was retrieved at the reporting date.
My estimates for the enlarged sample of FTSE 350 companies are reported in
table 3.6, which has the same structure as table 3.3. The ﬁrst two columns report
estimates for the Ohlson model with just book value and earnings as independent
21See section 3.1, in particular table 3.1.
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variables using respectively sector and company ﬁxed eﬀects, their coeﬃcient are
remarkably similar to the estimates for core book value and earnings in the follow-
ing two columns. Columns 3 and 4 report estimates for Equation (3.1) and (3.2).
Net pension assets are still overvalued but slightly less than in my main sample of
FTSE 100 constituents. Here the service cost anomaly is less pronounced than in
FTSE 100 sample, pension earnings are still negative but the result is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. As in the previous estimation I use clustered standard error at
the sector level and wild cluster bootstrap results are reported in the appendix.
3.7.2 Tobin'S Q
The second model I employ to test the valuation of deﬁned beneﬁt pension schemes
is derived from Tobin (1969), much in the spirit of Feldstein and Seligman (1981)
and Liu and Tonks (2010). I deﬁned Q as in the latter, namely as market value
of equity plus book value of long term debt over total ﬁrm assets. Under strict
assumptions, the value of Q should be equal to one in equilibrium; however the
situation in the real world could be diﬀerent. To take this into account, I include
a set of control variables that may have an eﬀect on Q, following again Liu and
Tonks (2010).
I deﬁne Total earnings (Etot) as net earnings plus interest expenses on debt.22
To control for the growth trajectory of the ﬁrm, I include 5y earnings growth,
deﬁned as the average of the last ﬁve years earnings minus the average of the ﬁve
previous years; I also deﬁne its three years equivalent to limit the loss of obser-
vations caused by the data requirement of this variable. I also include net debt,
deﬁned as cash holdings minus total debt; hence a positive value indicates that
the ﬁrm is a net creditor. All these variables are standardized by total company
22Using net earnings instead of this variable does not alter my results.
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Table 3.6: FTSE 350 companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Book Value 1.027** 1.461***
(0.396) (0.124)
Earnings 4.698*** 1.339***
(1.146) (0.308)
Core Book Value 1.067** 1.535***
(0.433) (0.154)
NPA 1.467** 1.157**
(0.546) (0.481)
Core Earnings 4.752*** 1.395***
(1.159) (0.332)
NPPC -4.965 -3.856
(2.994) (2.163)
Fixed Eﬀects Sector Company Sector Company
N 1408 1408 1408 1408
R2 0.447 - 0.453 -
Estimation results using the enlarged FTSE 350 sample, from 2006 to 2012.
The independent variable is market capitalisation at the reporting date. Core
book value is book value minus net pension assets, core earnings are net
income minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC), the measure of pension-
related earnings in income. Net pension assets are the diﬀerence between
pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm. All the variables are standardized
by total company assets. When imposing ﬁxed eﬀect at the sector level, I use
the broadest GISC sector classiﬁcation with 10 sectors in total. The standard
errors are clustered at the sector level.
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assets. The last control variable I add is the ﬁrm CAPM beta, computed using
one year of weekly returns against the FTSE 100 index. I test this model using
both the reported and gilt adjusted value for net pension assets, bringing to the
data the following equations:
Qi,t = α+
10∑
s=1
γsSs+β1Etoti,t+β25yGrowthi,t+β3NPAti,t+β4Debti,t+β5Betai,t+i,t
(3.6)
In the estimation I progressively drop the control variables to ensure that they
are not driving the results. Total earnings average about 50 per cent above net
earnings. The growth trajectory of earnings is positive for most companies, both
if measured over a ﬁve or three year period. The values for Tobin's Q are very
plausible, with an average about 1.1 and median very close to 1; for most of the
ﬁnancial companies in my dataset (mainly the high street banks) the value for Q is
understandably lower. Excluding them from the sample as in Liu and Tonks (2010)
does not materially change my results. Net debt averages at about 18 per cent of
total assets but with considerable variation, with most ﬁrms being net debtors as
expected. The beta against the FTSE 100 is very close to one on average. The
estimation results are presented in table 3.7. I start with Equation (3.6) in the
ﬁrst column, then substitute the 5 years growth terms with its 3 years counterpart
in column 2. Column 3 drops the earnings growth term entirely, while column 4
drops the net debt term as well. Columns 5 to 8 repeat the same exercise using
Risk-free NPA instead of the reported values. The results in table 3.7 broadly
conﬁrm the ﬁndings I highlighted in the previous sections: the coeﬃcients on net
pension assets are consistently above one, even though their signiﬁcance depends
on the speciﬁcation and the sample. On the other hand, adjusting their value using
a discount rate that does not allow for credit risk yields estimates very close to
87
unity and signiﬁcantly lower standard errors, irrespective of the diﬀerent samples
and controls. Also in these estimation I used clustering at the sector level and
present wild bootstrap results in the appendix.
As with the Ohlson model, I compared the models with Risk-free NPA in
table 3.7 with their counterparts that use reported NPA as measure of pension
deﬁcit. Vuong's test statistics indicates that each Risk-free NPA model is always
preferred to its counterpart at least with a 1% conﬁdence level. Also enforced
nesting conﬁrms that Risk-free NPA is preferred.
3.8 Conclusion
Comparing my results with the previous literature investigating the issue of pricing
of deﬁned beneﬁt pension schemes in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, it seems
that the increased disclosure brought by IAS 19 has improved the way in which
investors evaluate these schemes. However the European (and equivalent US)
accounting standard falls short on the discount rate, where both ﬁnancial theory
and market valuation suggest the use of a credit risk-free rate rather than corporate
bond yields. As I have argued, this is more than a technical issue as such a move
would reduce the reported market capitalization of FTSE ﬁrms by about 7%.
My results suggest that even though such a change would increase reported
pension liabilities dramatically, the market impact would be muted since market
participants already incorporate lower discount rates into their valuations. Given
these results, it seems logical that IAS 19 itself should move to government bond
yield based discounting of pension liabilities. Even though such a change would
have limited market impact it could improve the regulation, monitoring and report-
ing of pension liabilities. Also, since my results suggest that market participants
carefully judge pension liabilities when valuing ﬁrms they imply that other moves
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to reveal even more actuarial information, such as life expectancy assumptions,
could help the market arrive at an even more accurate valuation of pensions.
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3.9 Appendix A2: Beta of Pension Liabilities and
Pension Put
In the main paper I argue that pension liabilities should be discounted at a risk-
free rate. There are two issue that can potentially undermine my claim: pension
liabilities could have a degree of systemic risk that justiﬁes a higher discount rate
and the existence of public insurance for DB schemes of bankrupt sponsors could
create an option to ooad the pension deﬁcit on the Pension Protection Fund. I
address them in turn.
Do the pension liabilities have a degree of systemic risk that justiﬁes discounting
them at a rate incorporating some risk premium? In their model Sundaresan and
Zapatero (1997) assume that wages and the stock market are perfectly correlated,
and thus pension wage-related pension liabilities will also be correlated with the
market. While in their model this assumption is a necessary simpliﬁcation as it
guarantees a closed form solution, the empirical evidence supporting it is very
limited. Most empirical papers (e.g. Jin et al., 2006 and Cooper, 2009) suggest
that the beta of pension liabilities is in fact the same as that of government bonds.
Table 3.8 shows estimates of the beta of pension liabilities and of government
bonds (gilts) over my sample. The ﬁrst line shows the relationship between the
yearly returns on pension liabilities and the market index (FTSE 100 or FTSE
350). The point estimates are around -0.3 and statistically signiﬁcant. Although
this estimate does suggest that the beta of pension liabilities could be higher than
that of gilts, there is a potential bias in the estimate. Since the pension liabilities
reported by the ﬁrm are discounted by the AA corporate bond yield, the fact
that the credit spread on these bonds is likely to be correlated with the market
index may create a spurious relationship. The second line of table 3.8 shows
90
the relationship between the market index and pension liabilities discounted at
the risk-free discount rate (based on government bond yields, see section 3.4.1 for
details of how this adjustment was undertaken). This estimate is very close to zero
and more comparable with the beta on gilts shown in the last line of the table.
Overall, therefore it seems that over my sample the beta on pension liabilities is
close to zero and similar to that on gilts. This is in line with other empirical studies
and suggests that the gilt yields are an appropriate discount rate for UK pension
liabilities.
Table 3.8: Beta of the Pension Liabilities
Method Beta estimate Standard Error
Beta of pension liabilities -0.3 0.033
Beta of risk-free discounted pension liabilities -0.04 0.032
Beta of monthly returns on gilts -0.08 0.093
The ﬁrst two lines show the beta of pension liabilities against the FTSE 100 index, using
a simple CAPM regression with yearly data. The last line shows the same model using
monthly returns on a coupon-stripped gilt with duration of 18 years against the FTSE 100,
using all in-sample observations.
The creation of the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the
United States23 gave rise a lively academic discussion on the implication of state
guarantee for deﬁned beneﬁt pensions, focused on evaluating the put option for the
ﬁrm created by this regulation, its implication for the management of the pension
liabilities and the solvency of PBGC itself. One of the ﬁrst papers to discuss the
issue is Sharpe and Treynor (1977) that shows qualitatively how the value of the
pension put is increasing in the size of the pension plan relative to ﬁrm's assets,
its underfunding and the riskiness of the assets it holds. A more recent theoretical
treatment of the subject is provided by Love et al. (2011), who investigates how
government insurance provides incentive for risk shifting if it is mispriced, though
23The PBGC was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974.
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Rauh (2009) in his empirical investigation on US companies ﬁnds that ﬁrms with
low credit rating and underfunded pension funds tend to invest in safer assets
than their stronger peers. Bartram (2018) provides more evidence that companies
integrate DB schemes in their overall ﬁnancial management, but his ﬁndings are
mostly supportive of risk management, with limited evidence of risk shifting during
major economic downturns.
As in the US, the deﬁned beneﬁt pension schemes in my sample are insured
by the Pension Protection Fund, so if the sponsoring company goes bankrupt
the workers do not lose their pensions entirely. As the literature discusses, this
insurance may give rise to a put option for the sponsoring entity if in case of
bankruptcy it can ooad the pension fund's deﬁcit on the PPF, thus leaving
the other creditors of the company with a higher chance of getting at least a
partial repayment. If this option exists under the UK regulation, then it should
be accounted for in pricing the pension liabilities. Although the existence of a
Pension Put may not alter the appropriate discount rate for pension liabilities, it
may indicate that the true value of those liabilities for the ﬁrm is lower than that
reported (i.e. the true value should adjust for the value of the put that the ﬁrm
holds). However, it is however quite hard to envision a signiﬁcant pension put in
the UK. If a scheme enters in the PPF, the latter has an unsecured credit towards
the failed sponsoring company equal to the deﬁcit of its pension fund calculated
on a full (gilt yield discounted) buy-out basis, which is always substantially higher
than the reported deﬁcit. Although a recent judgement by the Supreme Court in
the Nortel/Lehman case made clear that the PPF does not have any precedence
over other unsecured creditors, schemes insured by the PPF have to pay a levy
to fund the operation of the PPF itself where the levy structure is related to the
riskiness of the ﬁrm. Even though McCarthy and Neuberger (2005) show that this
risk-related premium is not precisely fairly priced, it does signiﬁcantly reduce the
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market value of the pension put since the risk-related levy ﬁrms pay to the PPF
oﬀset the value of the put they hold. Given these circumstances and my focus on
the components of FTSE 100 index, I do have little evidence that the pension put
has a material impact on the market value of pension liabilities over my sample.
3.10 Appendix B2: Robustness
This section presents estimations that test the robustness of my results. First I
discuss the wild bootstrap of the t-statistic as in Cameron et al. (2008), then I
present results clustering the standard errors at the ﬁrm level as Petersen (2009)
suggests for panel data with a short time dimension. After I show that using the
balance sheet ﬁgure for NPA rather than the tax-adjusted measure that I use in
the main paper does not change my results. Lastly, I limit my analysis to the
companies that disclose the sensitivity analysis of the pension obligation in the
notes to their ﬁnancial statements.
3.10.1 Bootstrap t-statistic
Clustering at the sector level allows me to assume the richest correlation structure
for standard errors, but it is problematic in my data due to the small number of
clusters and their unequal size. The wild bootstrap of the t-statistics solves both
problem, so I employ this technique to correct my standard errors. Moreover, I use
the weight structure proposed by Webb (2013) and later endorsed in Cameron and
Miller (2015) when the number of clusters is smaller than 15. Mackinnon and Webb
(2017) discuss in detail the properties of this technique, showing how it approaches
the true rejection rates even with unbalanced cluster size. The procedure for using
the cluster wild bootstrap of Cameron et al. (2008) to perform the test on β2 in
Equation (3.1) is as follows:
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1. Estimate Equation (3.1) by OLS.
2. Calculate tˆ2, the t-statistic for β2 = 0, using cluster robust standard errors.
3. Estimate by OLS the restricted regression
Mcapig = α + β1BV cig + β3Ecig + β4NPPCig + ig (3.7)
where the subscript g indicates the cluster, imposing the null hypothesis that
β2 = 0.
4. Store the restricted residual ˜ig and the restricted estimate β˜H0 .
5. For each of B bootstrap replications, generate a new set of bootstrap depen-
dent variables y?ig using the data generating process
y?ig = β˜H0 + ˜igv
?
g (3.8)
where v?g is a random variable that takes values −
√
3
2
, -1, −
√
1
2
,
√
1
2
, 1,
√
3
2
with equal probability. 24
6. For each bootstrap replication, indexed by j, estimate regression (1) using
y?ig as the regressand and calculate tˆ
?
2j, the bootstrap t-statistic for β2 = 0
using clustered standard errors.
7. Calculate the bootstrap p-value as
pˆ?s =
1
B
B∑
i=1
I(|tˆ?2j| > |tˆ2|) (3.9)
24This is the weight distribution proposed by Webb (2013). The original Cameron et al. (2008)
uses Rademacher weights.
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I run 1000 replication for each of my estimation. The resulting p-values for NPA
in table 3.3 are 0.20 using sector ﬁxed eﬀects (column 3) and 0.02 using company
ﬁxed eﬀects (column 4). As usual the speciﬁcations with Risk-free NPA have
stronger signiﬁcance, with bootstrap p-values of 0.03 in column 1 of table 3.4 and
0.002 using company ﬁxed eﬀects (column 2 of table 3.4). The bootstrap increases
the standard errors also using the enlarged sample of FTSE 350 constituents, with
p-values for NPA of 0.058 for the speciﬁcation in column 3 of table 3.6 and 0.085
for the one in column 4 of the same table. Regarding my estimation of Tobin's Q
model, NPA is not signiﬁcant at the conventional levels in any of the speciﬁcations
in table 3.7, while the empirical p-values for Risk-free NPA in table 3.7 are 0.11 in
column 5, 0.025 in column 6, 0.029 in column 7 and 0.025 in column 8.
3.10.2 Clustering standard errors at the company level
Allowing the regression residuals to be correlated at the ﬁrm rather than the sector
level entails a more restrictive assumption, but Petersen (2009) shows that the
resulting standard errors are a good approximation in panel datasets with a short
time dimension like the one I am using. Table 3.9 shows how my main estimation
using clustering at the company level. While there are some minor diﬀerence in
the signiﬁcance of regressors from the tables in the main paper, the results have
the same interpretation.
3.10.3 Companies with missing sensitivity analysis
As discussed in section 3.4.1, about one third of the companies in my sample lack
the sensitivity analysis that I need to compute the duration of the pension obli-
gation and the corresponding Risk-free NPA. While in my main estimation I use
the ﬁnancial statements from 2013 to estimate the duration of the pension obliga-
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Table 3.9: Clustering by company
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Book Value 0.526** 1.490***
(0.239) (0.391)
Earnings 5.043*** 2.019***
(1.233) (0.733)
Core Book Value 0.480** 1.591*** 0.442* 1.627***
(0.244) (0.395) (0.243) (0.379)
NPA 1.964* 1.115
(1.130) (0.744)
Risk-free NPA 1.038*** 1.010***
(0.381) (0.327)
Core Earnings 5.018*** 2.113*** 5.078*** 2.028***
(1.197) (0.737) (1.187) (0.735)
NPPC 2.302 -5.689 -1.994 -4.339
(8.437) (6.504) (7.724) (6.381)
Fixed Eﬀects Sector Company Sector Company Sector Company
N 511 511 511 511 511 511
R2 0.575 - 0.578 - 0.592 -
Table presents my estimation results using the main FTSE 100 sample, using standard errors
clustered at the company level. The independent variable is market capitalisation at the reporting
date. Core book value is book value minus net pension assets, core earnings are net income
minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC), the measure of pension-related earnings in income.
Net pension assets are the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm, the
tax adjustment is due to the tax credit associated with pension contributions in the UK. The
calculations behind Risk-free NPA are described in section 4.1 of the main paper. All the variables
are standardized by total company assets. When imposing ﬁxed eﬀect at the sector level, I use
the broadest GISC sector classiﬁcation with 10 sectors in total.
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tion of these companies, this section reports my main estimates using a restricted
sample that drops all the companies that did not publish any sensitivity analysis
during the years covered by my sample. Doing so increases the standard errors in
nearly all the estimates, but does not impair the signiﬁcance of my variables of
interest.
Table 3.10: Restricted sample with sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Book Value 0.013 1.903***
(0.536) (0.438)
Earnings 4.745** 1.270*
(1.711) (0.630)
Core Book Value -0.065 2.183*** -0.018 2.220***
(0.497) (0.488) (0.477) (0.458)
Tax-adjusted NPA 0.860 1.301**
(0.802) (0.505)
Risk-free NPA 0.892*** 1.249***
(0.158) (0.214)
Core Earnings 4.593** 1.359* 4.586** 1.203
(1.794) (0.717) (1.749) (0.679)
NPPC 7.467 -1.955 2.872 -0.034
(5.169) (2.216) (3.306) (2.130)
Fixed Eﬀects Sector Company Sector Company Sector Company
N 358 358 358 358 358 358
R2 0.595 - 0.599 - 0.614 -
Table presents my estimation results using the main FTSE 100 sample excluding all the compa-
nies that do not report any sensitivity analysis in their notes to the ﬁnancial statements. The
independent variable is market capitalisation at the reporting date. Core book value is book value
minus net pension assets, core earnings are net income minus net periodic pension cost (NPPC),
the measure of pension-related earnings in income. Net pension assets are the diﬀerence between
pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm, the tax adjustment is due to the tax credit associated
with pension contributions in the UK. All the variables are standardized by total company assets.
When imposing ﬁxed eﬀect at the sector level, I use the broadest GISC sector classiﬁcation with
10 sectors in total. The standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
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3.11 Appendix C2: Accounting NPA
As section 3.4 discusses, my main estimates are based on tax-adjusted NPA. In
this section I show that the estimation results for unadjusted NPA are very similar
to what I present in the main paper, for both the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 350
samples. Clearly the accounting deﬁcit is larger without taking the associated tax
credit into account, averaging at 2.86 per cent of assets for the FTSE 100 sample
and at 2.78 per cent of assets for the enlarged sample of FTSE 350 constituents.
Table 3.11 presents the estimation results for the Ohlson model using the unad-
justed ﬁgures. As expected, the coeﬃcients on unadjusted NPA are slightly smaller
without taking the tax credit into account, leaving my interpretation unaﬀected.
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Table 3.11: Unadjusted NPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Core Book Value 0.479 1.588*** 1.067** 1.544***
(0.413) (0.418) (0.433) (0.153)
NPA 1.428* 0.820*** 1.090** 0.982**
(0.720) (0.235) (0.393) (0.299)
Core Earnings 5.014** 2.11*** 4.752*** 1.389***
(1.642) (0.558) (1.158) (0.330)
NPPC 2.200 -5.779* -5.051 -3.984*
(3.746) (2.591) (3.001) (2.107)
Fixed Eﬀects Sector Company Sector Company
N 511 511 1408 1408
R2 0.578 - 0.453 -
Table presents my estimation results using unadjusted NPA for both my
samples, the ﬁrst two columns report estimates for the FTSE 100 while the
last two report results for the FTSE 350. The independent variable is market
capitalisation at the reporting date. Core book value is book value minus net
pension assets, core earnings are net income minus net periodic pension cost
(NPPC), the measure of pension-related earnings in income. Net pension
assets are the diﬀerence between pension assets and liabilities for each ﬁrm.
All the variables are standardized by total company assets. When imposing
ﬁxed eﬀect at the sector level, I use the broadest GISC sector classiﬁcation
with 10 sectors in total. The standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
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Chapter 4
The importance of reading the small
print: analysts' estimates and
pension accounting
4.1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether analysts incorporate all the pension information
available to them under IAS 19 when forecasting earnings. My goal is twofold:
ﬁrst to ascertain if analysts use complex information that is repeatedly disclosed
by the companies they follow and second if they anticipate the mechanical earning
eﬀects of an accounting revision. Analysts are important and sophisticated users of
ﬁnancial statements, so answering these questions would help evaluate the recent
changes in accounting for deﬁned beneﬁt pensions. Moreover, it would give in-
sights in how analysts use ﬁnancial statements and accounting information that is
repeatedly made available to them, as well as in how they process the implications
of changes in accounting regulation.
Accounting for deﬁned beneﬁt (henceforth DB) pensions underwent a series of
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changes in the past ﬁfteen years, with the goals of making it more transparent and
useful for users of ﬁnancial statements IASB (2011). The International Accounting
Standard Board (IASB) introduced IAS 19 in 2006, revolutionising DB pension
accounting by introducing fair value. Despite this change, pension accounting
remains a technically complex area, with most of the relevant information disclosed
in the notes rather than on the balance sheet or income statement.
In this paper I focus on sell-side analysts because they are a sophisticated class
of users of ﬁnancial statements and perform an important role in disseminating
information in the market, aiding the process of price discovery. DB pension ac-
counting provides an ideal setting to test the forecasting ability of analysts for a
two reasons. It is complex, but the ﬁnancial component of future pension earn-
ings can be reliably estimated using information that companies disclose in their
annual report. Moreover, the changes introduced by the revised IAS 19 during my
sample modify the formula to estimate future pension income, but were announced
nearly two years before they became mandatory and so although their impact on
each company's earnings can be mechanically estimated it would require careful
attention by analysts.
I ﬁnd that analysts repeatedly failed to incorporate changes in pension income
in their earnings forecasts, despite the fact that such changes can be reliably esti-
mated using information publicly available at least 8 month before the earnings are
realised. This result is in line with a large body of literature that investigates the
formation of analysts' forecasts and shows that they regularly fail to incorporate
the relationship between accounting information and earnings (see for example
Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Chang et al. (2016)). We also show that analysts do
not anticipate the eﬀects of changes in regulation that have a mechanical impact
on the earnings they are estimating, improving their forecasts only after being sur-
prised. Again, this result ﬁts in the wider literature showing how analysts fail to
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grasp the eﬀects of accounting changes in their forecasts, even when these changes
can be estimated precisely in advance, as shown for example in Plumlee (2003)
and Chen and Schoderbek (2000). My work also contributes to the strand of lit-
erature that investigates how analysts deal with complex information, reinforcing
the ﬁnding that they generally struggle in such settings, as shown by Frankel et al.
(2006), Gu and Wang (2005), Duru and Reeb (2002) and many others.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a
detailed background of my work, then in section 4.3 I discuss the relevant literature
and develop my hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the empirical strategy and the
data that I use, then my empirical results are presented in section 4.5. The last
section concludes.
4.2 Institutional background
The relevant accounting standard for UK companies during the period I examine is
IAS 19, eﬀective from 2006, and its revised version (henceforth IAS 19R) eﬀective
from 2013. This section explains how the income component of a DB pension
scheme is calculated according to both versions of IAS 19.
The eﬀect of a DB beneﬁt pension scheme on the earnings of its sponsoring
company is not directly linked to cash contributions to the pension fund, but is
rather an accounting accrual called net periodic pension cost (henceforth NPPC).
Conceptually, it can be separated into two distinct parts, an operative component
and a ﬁnancial one, and often companies choose to split the reporting of DB
income/cost this way in their ﬁnancial statements. The operative part is service
cost, an expense representing the pension beneﬁts earned by employees during
the accounting period. The ﬁnancial component encompasses interest cost on
pension liabilities (representing the impact of the passage of time on the discounted
102
value of future pension commitments) and the expected return on pension assets.
Companies have to use the rate on comparable high quality corporate bonds to
discount their pension obligation and thus determine interest cost,1 while before
the introduction of IAS 19R they were free to choose the expected rate of return
(henceforth ERR) on pension assets.
Hence both the discount rate on pension liabilities and the ERR on pension
assets are speciﬁc to every company: the former is determined by the currency
and duration of pension obligations, while the latter depends on pension asset
allocation. In practice companies enjoyed considerable freedom in deciding the
ERR and prior academic work showed that DB sponsors used this freedom to set
assumption strategically.2 A further components of pension cost are exceptional
items such as settlement and curtailments, where changes to the retirement beneﬁts
oﬀered to workers generate a one-oﬀ earning accrual.
In June 2011 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) revised
IAS 19, with the revision coming into eﬀect for accounting periods starting on or
after the ﬁrst of January 2013 (early adoption was permitted). The main change
concerns the ERR on pension assets: IAS 19R mandates that companies use the
discount rate on the pension obligation to calculate expected return on pension
assets. This change removes some discretion in the calculation of the ﬁnancial
component of NPPC, eﬀectively making it equal to the surplus or deﬁcit of the
pension fund times the discount rate, irrespective of the speciﬁc pension assets
allocation of each company. For most of the companies in my sample this entails
an increase in reported pension costs with respect to prior reporting requirements.
1This choice is contentious, with many papers arguing that this is not the appropriate rate
to discount pension liabilities. See Brown and Pennacchi (2016) for a recent discussion.
2See for instance work by Bergstresser et al. (2006) and An et al. (2014). These works use US
data, where the institutional setting is diﬀerent. However, the American accounting standards
for deﬁned beneﬁt pensions is actually identical to the original IAS 19 in the determination of
net periodic pension cost.
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The ﬁnancial component of pension earnings can be estimated in advance using
the sponsoring company's disclosure in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements, under
both version of IAS 19. Section 4.4 describes the detail of such estimation and
ﬁgure 4.1 summarizes the timeline, showing that all the data for this calculation
are available to market participants at least 8 months before the realisation of the
earnings being predicted. The next section develops the hypotheses that I test in
section 4.5 and puts them in the context of the wider literature.
4.3 Literature review and hypotheses development
Both analysts' forecasts and pension accounting are topics that have been investi-
gated extensively in the economics and ﬁnance literature, a full review is outside
the scope of this work. This section relates my work to the broader literature,
focusing on the papers that are closest to the problems I investigate.
Prior academic literature shows that analysts struggle to fully reﬂect the impli-
cations of complex accounting disclosure in their earnings estimates. For instance,
Chang et al. (2016) ﬁnd that analysts routinely misjudge the earnings implication
of ﬁrms' derivatives positions, with the result driven by the complexity of the re-
porting requirements rather than the actual sophistication of the ﬁrms' derivatives
positions. Bradshaw et al. (2001) show that analysts (and auditors) fail to predict
the future earnings implications of accounting accruals, while Frankel et al. (2006)
argue that analysts' reports are less informative when processing information is
costly because of complexity. Chen et al. (2015) ﬁnd that analysts' estimates are
less precise and more disperse for companies that report goodwill impairments rel-
ative to a matched sample of companies that do not. Perhaps the closest work is
Picconi (2006), who looks at changes in pension plans parameters and ﬁnds that
analysts fail to anticipate the earnings implications of such changes.
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The fact that analysts' accuracy in forecasting earnings decreases as the com-
plexity of the task increases is well documented in the literature, covering more
settings than the intricacy of ﬁnancial reporting. For instance, Duru and Reeb
(2002) ﬁnd that earnings forecasts are less accurate for American companies with
bigger overseas operations, Gu and Wang (2005) ﬁnd that forecasts are more dis-
persed for ﬁrms with higher intangible assets intensity, Haw et al. (1994) show that
accuracy decreases signiﬁcantly after a merger (to recover later on) and Lehavy
et al. (2011) argue that readability of companies' disclosure is linked to forecast
accuracy and dispersion.
DB pension accounting is quite elaborated and represent an ideal setting to
test how analysts cope with complex information, since in this context the small
print can be exploited to predict accurately a component of income. I use this
background to test the following hypothesis:
H1: mechanically estimated changes in pension cost are predictive of
analyst forecast errors
My work also relates to a set of papers that investigate how analysts react to
changes in accounting for the companies they follow.3 Chen and Schoderbek (2000)
use the 1993 tax increase and ﬁnd that analysts failed to incorporate the resulting
deferred tax adjustments in their earnings forecasts. Using a diﬀerent set of tax
changes, Plumlee (2003) shows how analysts revise their forecasts to take into
account the less complex changes but not the more complicated ones, suggesting
3In the discussion of the literature on analysts' reaction to accounting changes I am delib-
erately avoiding a review of the enormous literature analyzing the eﬀects of the introduction of
IFRS around the world. The reason is twofold. First, the task is outside the scope of the present
work. Second, I believe that such a revolution in accounting practice is not comparable with
the small and incremental change that I am analyzing. A worldwide overhaul in accounting is
likely to have captured the full attention of market participants, regulators and users of ﬁnancial
statements at large. Hence I think there are good reasons to believe that my setting is diﬀerent
from the background of research investigating the introduction of IFRS.
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that they struggle in assimilating complex information. In the UK context, Acker
et al. (2002) argue that the introduction of FRS3 improved forecasts' accuracy
(as it was expected given that this accounting change increased the information
content of ﬁnancial reporting), but not in the ﬁrst year of its introduction as
analysts struggled to cope with the new disclosure.
As discussed above, the introduction of IAS 19R changed the formula to de-
termine the ﬁnancial component of NPPC, reducing the sponsors' discretion and
making the mechanical estimation of pension cost easier. I use the introduction of
IAS 19R in 2013 to test the following two hypotheses:
H2: mechanically estimated changes in pension cost are still predictive
of analyst forecast errors even under the simpler IAS 19R
H3: analysts' do not anticipate the eﬀect on earnings of the introduc-
tion of IAS 19R, but their estimates improve thereafter
H2 tests if the simpler calculation required to estimate changes in pension cost
under IAS 19R improve analysts' perception of this element of EPS. H3 focuses
on the ﬁrst year in which IAS 19R was introduced. As table 4.2 below shows,
the change from IAS 19 to its revised version increases signiﬁcantly the diﬀer-
ence between simple and informed estimates for pension costs. Hence analysts
have a stronger incentive to take this reform into account when estimating EPS.
Moreover the accounting reform was announced two years prior and the publicity
around this event could have pointed the attention of analysts to its eﬀect. These
two factors suggest that it is worth looking at the year in which IAS 19R was
introduced separately from the rest of the sample where companies account under
this standard.
My work also relates to the vast literature examining the eﬀect of DB pensions
on ﬁrm value. Most of those works focus on the surplus/deﬁcit of the pension fund
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(Hann et al. (2007a), Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et al. (2008)
among many others), as this impacts future cash ﬂows of the sponsoring ﬁrm
through contributions to the fund. While the results of these works do not always
coincide, overall they show that investors tend to focus more on information that
is recognised on the ﬁnancial statements rather than what is disclosed in the notes,
even if the latter is arguably more important in estimating future cash ﬂows and
hence ﬁrm value. My results on analysts point in the same direction, suggesting
that also they seem to disregard disclosure in the notes and instead focus on
information recognised on the ﬁnancial statements.
4.4 Methodology and data
This paper focuses on the ﬁnancial component of NPPC as it can be estimated
fairly precisely using information disclosed in the sponsors' annual report, unlike
service cost and exceptional items. Moreover, since DB schemes in the UK are
largely a legacy issue, with the vast majority of the schemes closed to new members
and most closed to future accruals, the ﬁnancial component makes up the majority
of NPPC. This section illustrates how I compute the informed forecasts for interest
cost and expected return on pension assets using the companies' disclosure, while
the next subsection speciﬁes how I test for the incorporation of this information
in the published forecasts.
Figure 4.1 describes the timeline for my estimation. I deﬁne it in terms of ﬁscal
year, so that every company closes its balance sheet in month 12 irrespective of the
diﬀerent choices of reporting year. I make the conservative assumption that the
annual report is published within 4 months from the end of the ﬁscal year, such
that market participants have access to the ﬁnancial statements and the notes
during month 4. At this stage it is possible to use that disclosure to develop
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Figure 4.1: Timeline for estimating informed earnings forecasts
informed expectations about the future evolution of the ﬁnancial components of
NPPC. Hence my regression analysis in section 4.5 spans from month 4 to month
12, when the earnings are realized.
According to the timeline in ﬁgure 4.1 I can estimate interest cost in year 1
using public information disclosed in the companies' annual report for year 0 in
the following way:
Informed Interest Cost1 = DiscountRate0 ∗ PensionLiability0 (4.1)
and for expected return on pension assets under IAS 19:
InformedExpectedReturn1 = ERR0 ∗ PensionAssets0 (4.2)
where I obtain ERR0 using the following approximation for companies report-
ing under the original version of IAS 19:
ERR0 = ExpectedReturn0/(PensionAssets0 + PensionAssets−1)/2 (4.3)
which assumes a linear increase or decrease of assets in year 0. After the
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introduction of IAS 19R in 2013 the ERR on pension assets in equation 2 is equal
to the discount rate in equation 1. I prefer to approximate the expected return
this way rather than use the companies' disclosure because it is quite patchy,
with a only small minority of companies reporting their ERR in the notes. Most
companies disclose their assumed rate of return for each individual asset class in
their pension assets instead, making the computation of each company's average
ERR time consuming and uncertain.
Combining the results of equations (1) and (2) gives the informed forecast for
the ﬁnancial component of pension cost, net interest cost:
InformedNet Interest Cost1 = Inf ExpectedReturn1 − Inf Interest Cost1
(4.4)
For the base forecast I hypothesise that analyst do not respond to changes in
the information disclosed in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements but rely only on
income statement data, thus assuming that net interest cost is not going to change
from last year:
BaseNet Interest Cost1 = Net Interest Cost0 (4.5)
The diﬀerence between the informed and the base forecast for net interest cost
gives my variable of interest for the regression analysis in section 4.5:
∆PensionCost1 = InformedNet Interest Cost1 −BaseNet Interest Cost1
(4.6)
This variable allows me to test the hypotheses speciﬁed in section 4.3, i. e.
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if analysts use the pension information disclosed in the annual reports to better
forecast the sponsors' earnings or if they assume the pension component of income
to be unchanged from last year.
4.4.1 Model
To investigate whether analysis incorporate changes in the parameters determining
net interest cost in their earnings forecast I follow the methodology proposed by
Rajgopal et al. (2003) and later used by Picconi (2006), which I modify slightly
to suit my purposes. I deﬁne monthly forecast error (FE) on year 1 earnings as
realized EPS minus the consensus forecast at the end of each month and I regress
it on ∆PensionCost and a battery of control variables based on year 0 values:
FEi,t+1,m = α + β1∆PensionCosti,t+1 + β2EPSi,t + β3FEi,t + β4Book/Marketi,t
+β5Sizei,t + β6Betai,t + β7EPS/Pricei,t + β8Agei,t + β9NetOperating Assetsi,t
+β10Total Accrualsi,t +
I∑
i=1
γiDi +
T∑
t=1
γtDt + i,t,m
(4.7)
where Book/Market is the ratio between book value and market value, Size
is market capitalisation, Beta is computed against the index using one year of
returns, Price is share price, Age is calculated in years from IPO (or from 1988 if
IPO was before then), Net operating assets are calculated as (operating assets -
operating liabilities)/lagged total assets, Total Accruals are computed as (earnings
- cash ﬂow)/lagged total assets and dummies for years and company ﬁxed eﬀects.
All control variables are included in their respective decile rank value, as in Picconi
(2006), with the exception of Age, Net Operating Assets and Total Accruals that
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are ranked in quintiles.4 The ranks are assigned using ﬁscal year end values for all
variables.
I use equation 4.7 above to investigate whether analysts incorporate the infor-
mation about pension earnings that companies disclose in the notes to the ﬁnancial
statements in their forecasts for EPS. My other research questions center on the
introduction of IAS 19R. To investigate whether analysts change their behaviour
after the introduction of the revised standard, I add a dummy called POST, set
equal to one when companies report under IAS 19R and zero otherwise. The
interaction between the POST dummy and my variable of interest identiﬁes the
diﬀerence in eﬀect between the two reporting regimes. To investigate H3 and iso-
late the eﬀect of the ﬁrst year of IAS 19R I add another dummy called REV that
takes value of 1 only when a company is reporting for the ﬁrst time using IAS
19R. Using it together with the POST dummy and the corresponding interaction
allows me to investigate the additional eﬀect speciﬁc to the year when IAS 19R
was introduced.
4.4.2 Data and descriptive statistics
I use as my sample all FTSE 350 constituents at 31/12/2012, the day before IAS
19R was introduced. My analysis starts in 2009, as I need 2 prior years of infor-
mation to construct the informed forecasts for ∆PensionCost. The assumptions
I need are disclosed by the companies only from 2006/2007 onwards (from the
introduction of the original version of IAS 19).
After excluding duplicates and investment vehicles, I am left with 293 com-
panies of which 210 have a DB pension. I exclude companies that change their
ﬁscal year end date over the sample and drop Xstrata because of its merger with
4Using buckets for the control variables allows me to mute the eﬀect of outliers and use
variables that have diﬀerent scales in the same regression.
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Glencore, Qinetic as it is the only early adopter of IAS 19R and Go-Ahead Group
because of its unique pension arrangements (it is part of collective schemes, mak-
ing its reporting and hence the predictions signiﬁcantly more complicated and
uncertain). Table 4.1 illustrates the composition of my sample. I include in the
regression analysis only companies for which I can compute ∆PensionCost, all the
control variables5 and I have at least one year with the full 12 month of consensus
earnings estimate. That leaves me with 201 unique companies and 1413 observa-
tions. Pension liabilities are on average close to 40% of market capitalisation for
ﬁrms in the sample, but the median is about 25%, with the mean driven by a hand-
ful of companies with a huge pension scheme. The absolute value of ∆PensionCost
over EPS shows that the diﬀerence between informed and base forecasts shrinks
signiﬁcantly after the introduction of IAS 19R, because of the reduced discretion
that companies enjoy in setting the assumptions determining pension cost under
the revised standard (the value for 2009 is due to a denominator eﬀect, EPS are
lower than in the other years in the sample).
Table 4.1: Sample description
year companies with DB with all data Pension liabilities ∆PensionCost
(as % of Market cap) (as % of EPS)
2009 278 202 168 48.73% 5.03%
2010 286 206 170 40.77% 3.34%
2011 292 208 176 42.84% 2.86%
2012 293 210 185 44.43% 1.75%
2013 292 210 185 37.12% 2.24%
2014 286 208 174 37.67% 2.39%
2015 274 204 181 40.74% 1.08%
2016 263 200 174 43.04% 0.85%
Table 4.1 describes the companies in the sample. Pension liabilities and market capitalisation
are retrieved at the balance sheet closing date. The ratio between ∆PensionCost and EPS is in
absolute value to show the diﬀerence between informed and base forecasts.
All the balance sheet data are retrieved at the balance sheet closing date from
5The only exceptions are net operating assets and total accruals, which have more missing
values than the rest of the controls. I set their quintile at zero for companies that have a missing
value.
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Bloomberg. For companies that do not report in Sterling, I converted the data
into Sterling using the closing exchange rate on the balance sheet closing date.
Bloomberg is the source also for consensus earnings forecasts, collected at the end
of each calendar month.
Table 4.2: Accuracy of informed and base estimates of net interest cost components
Panel A: absolute diﬀerence between realized and forecasts, pence per share
obs mean diﬀerence t statistic top 10% top 5%
interest simple 1413 0.771 0.237 6.419 1.674 3.000
cost informed 1413 0.534
expected pre simple 781 1.407 0.247 4.804 1.391 2.161
return informed 781 1.160
rev simple 179 1.473 1.022 7.271 3.293 5.071
informed 179 0.450
post simple 453 0.867 0.502 6.687 1.706 2.463
informed 453 0.365
Panel B: absolute diﬀerence between realized and forecasts, as percentage of EPS
obs mean diﬀerence t statistic top 10% top 5%
interest simple 1413 2.53% 1.03% 2.952 1.67% 3.00%
cost informed 1413 1.50%
expected pre simple 781 4.51% 1.05% 3.282 3.79% 5.55%
return informed 781 3.45%
rev simple 179 3.50% 2.50% 7.089 8.00% 10.72%
informed 179 0.99%
post simple 453 2.67% 1.68% 2.436 3.35% 6.06%
informed 453 0.98%
Table 4.2 shows the accuracy of informed and base forecasts for interest cost and expected return
on assets with respect to realized values, both in terms of pence per share and as a percentage
of EPS. The data for expected return are divided in 3 panels, pre refers to data before the
introduction of IAS 19R, rev data for the ﬁrst year when companies adopted the revised standard
and post for the following years.
Table 4.2 illustrates the diﬀerence between the informed and base forecasts for
the components of net interest cost in my sample. The informed forecasts are
consistently better in predicting the components of net interest cost, in terms of
both pence per share and as a percentage of earnings. Using informed estimates for
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interest cost rather than the base one improves the forecasts by 1% of net earnings
on average and more than three times as much for the companies with the biggest
pension schemes. I divided the forecasts for expected return on pension assets in
3 panels: before the introduction of IAS 19R, the ﬁrst year in which IAS 19R was
introduced and the latter period. In general the improvement of forecasts using
informed estimates is higher for expected return than for interest cost, especially in
the ﬁrst year of IAS 19R (as expected, since the ERR on pension assets moved to
the discount rate). In that year, using the base forecast rather than the informed
one for expected return implies a worsening of the forecasts of 2.5% of earnings
and of more than 8% for a tenth of companies.
4.5 Estimation and Results
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for equation 4.7 in my sample and two
partitions of it, investigating if analysts use the disclosure in the notes to the ﬁ-
nancial statements in their forecasts. I regress the forecast errors in consensus
estimates for next year's earnings starting four months after the end of each com-
pany's ﬁscal year until the end of that year, stopping when earnings are realised.
As speciﬁed in the timeline (ﬁgure 4.1), this assures that the annual reports for
year 0 are available when I start analysing the error in consensus forecasts for year
1 earnings. In all three panels of table 4.3 the average monthly forecast error is
negative and monotonically reducing as companies approach their reporting date,
indicating that on average analysts are too optimistic about the companies' EPS.
Using the full sample as in panel A it seems that analysts persistently fail to
incorporate all available information about DB pensions when making forecasts:
∆PensionCost is consistently positive and signiﬁcant. This indicates that the dif-
ference between the informed and base forecasts for the ﬁnancial component of
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pension cost explains the consensus earnings' forecast error, over and above the
battery of controls speciﬁed in equation 4.7 and notwithstanding the demanding
econometric speciﬁcation with ﬁrm and years ﬁxed eﬀects (in all the regressions
standard errors are clustered at the company level). The coeﬃcient on my variable
of interest is very close to one in months 5 to 10, while it shrinks in the last two
month before the closing of the balance sheet. This could be explained by analysts
gradually improving their forecasts over time using the information announced by
the companies during their ﬁscal year, as in Picconi (2006), but in this case only
partially.
The two following panels of results present the same model on diﬀerent subsam-
ples: before the introduction of IAS 19R for panel B and after its introduction for
panel C.6 The results in panel B are very close to the ones for panel A: the diﬀer-
ence between informed and base forecasts for net interest cost helps to explain the
error in consensus earnings' forecasts. The result is econometrically strong even
in this subsample, with the point estimates for the coeﬃcient on ∆PensionCost
slightly decreasing over time, hinting that analysts improved their forecasts over
time but not enough to fully include the expected change in pension earnings. The
results in Panel C are along the same lines as the regressions above, only much less
strong. I attribute this to the limited sample size as the dynamics do not seem to
be markedly diﬀerent from panel A.7
Next I turn my attention to the eﬀects of the introduction of IAS 19R. In order
to do so I rely on the same model described in section 4.4.1, adding a dummy called
POST that takes the value of 1 if a company reports under IAS 19R and interacting
it with ∆PensionCost to isolate the diﬀerence in analysts' estimates under the two
6I did not include the ﬁrst year of data under the new accounting regime in panel C because
of its peculiar behaviour, which is analysed later using the results in table 4.4.
7As a further robustness test, I tried a regressing equation 4.7 on a sample merging panels
B and C, identifying the diﬀerence between the two panels with a dummy. Also this test fails to
show any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two subsamples.
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regimes (panel A of table 4.4). In panel B of the same table I also add a dummy
called REV that takes value of 1 when a company is reporting under IAS 19R
for the ﬁrst time and the corresponding interaction, with the goal of investigating
H3, so to asses if the year when the reform was introduced is diﬀerent from the
following ones.
Table 4.4 presents the results. In panel A the coeﬃcient on ∆PensionCost is
signiﬁcant and close to 1, as I would expect given the estimates in table 4.3. Its
interaction with the POST dummy is indistinguishable from zero until month 10,
but in the last two months becomes negative and signiﬁcant. This would indicate
that analysts adjust their estimates to take into account the mechanical eﬀect of
changes in pension cost on earnings under the revised version of IAS 19 but not
under the original standard.
This ﬁnding is however challenged by the results in panel B. Highlighting the
ﬁrst year in which IAS 19R was mandatory tells a diﬀerent story, as the coeﬃcient
on the interaction between POST and ∆PensionCost turns positive, even if it is
weakly estimated. This would indicate that analysts do not change their behaviour
under IAS 19R, still avoiding to take into account the mechanical eﬀect of changes
of pension costs on earnings. Panel B makes clear that the negative coeﬃcient on
the POST interaction that I found in panel A was entirely due to the ﬁrst year
of companies reporting under IAS 19R: the interaction between the REV dummy
and ∆PensionCost is negative in all months, even if shy of signiﬁcance in most
of them. This result indicates that analysts paid attention to the changes in DB
pension costs when IAS 19R was ﬁrst introduced, but did not use the disclosure
in the notes to estimate the ﬁnancial component of NPPC in the following years.
This ﬁnding also reconciles the results of table 4.4 with what I found in panel C
of table 4.3, where I found that analysts did not incorporate the mechanical eﬀect
of ∆PensionCost in their forecast in a sample that includes all but the ﬁrst year
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of IAS 19R.
Overall the results in table 4.4 suggest that analysts did pay attention to the
introduction of IAS 19R, but later went back to ignoring the mechanical eﬀect
of changes in pension assumptions on EPS. This behaviour could be driven by
the publicity of the change in accounting standard. Changes in accounting are a
long process, with the new standard published two years before its introduction
date. Companies also warned user of ﬁnancial statements of this change in their
latest annual report before the introduction date of IAS 19R. As these warnings
faded, analysts reverted to ignoring the small print of pension disclosure. Another
possible driver of this behaviour has to do with analysts' incentives: as table 4.2
makes clear, the eﬀect of EPS is much bigger in the revision year. This could have
helped analysts anticipate the fact that the introduction of IAS 19R would have
had negative impact on the EPS of most of the companies they covered.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether analysts use all available information in the notes
to the ﬁnancial statements when forecasting future earnings. I ﬁnd that they
repeatedly fail to take into account changes in the income eﬀect of deﬁned ben-
eﬁt pensions, despite the fact that those changes can be reliably estimated well
in advance using publicly available information. This happens under both the ac-
counting regimes that I analyse in my sample, with no considerable diﬀerence after
the introduction of IAS 19R.
The exception if the year in which IAS 19R was introduced: in this case analysts
did anticipate its eﬀect on EPS, even if not fully. They had all the incentive to so,
as ignoring this would have increased their forecast error considerably. Moreover
the reform was widely publicized, by both the standard setting body and the
119
companies themselves.
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